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The Creative Surrender

A Comment on "Joanna Field's"* book *An Experiment in Leisure*

by

Anton Ehrenzweig

In my experience as an art teacher I found that creative sterility may be the result of ego rigidity impeding the free flow of mental imagery. The student cannot relax his all too deliberate control of the medium, nor can he tolerate any failure in realizing preconceived ideas; he is thus unable to absorb new stimuli arising from his work in progress. It follows that the art teacher's task is to make the student's personality more flexible and so to develop his latent creativity. What precisely these creative ego changes are, is difficult to say. The analyst is more concerned with resolving the id conflicts which stand in the foreground and call for all his skill; he will be inclined to let the sublimations that follow on the resolution of id conflict, look after themselves; he may consider creative development an educational rather than an analytical task. The art teacher who is in a better position to observe creative ego changes, lacks the conceptual tools to describe them for us. Yet the artist's never ceasing search for creative stimulation reveals itself every bit as dramatic and painful as is the psychoanalytical exploration of id conflict and ego defences.

It is our good fortune that Marion Milner, who finally became a psychoanalyst herself, continued her life-long search for creativeness without interruption by her psychoanalytical training. She felt that her creative search as an artist was something apart from her growing understanding of her id phantasies. For this reason perhaps she never bothered to reformulate more technically her creative experiences which

*pseudonym for Marion Milner.

she had gathered in her first two "Joanna Field" books, written before her psychoanalytical training. Her first book *A Life of One's Own* mainly dealt with the shedding of conventional clichés that had clattered up her life; her second book *An Experiment in Leisure* - as she called her creative search - dealt with finding truly potent imagery to replace the abandoned clichés. In my view this change in the character and function of mental imagery represents the crucial creative change in the ego. It needs only to be put into more technical language to make clear that Marion Milner has described a new approach to an ego psychology of creativeness.

We know how artists are apt to scan the world for potent images to give a new impetus to the flow of their imagination. These images do not serve them so much as picturesque 'motifs', i.e. as substitutes for free invention, but rather as a means for keeping their eyes fresh and their sensibility sharpened; unlike motifs, creative images need not become part of the actual composition. They merely act as catalysts for setting the creative process going and ultimately may lead to the invention of quite different ideas and shapes.

Marion Milner, too, soon gave up her search for motifs and instead scanned the world, her memory, and her imagination for more significant imagery, in a sustained effort to enhance her general sense of reality and beauty. As she was already to some extent familiar with psychoanalysis she was aware that the strength of such images did not derive from their conscious meanings, but from their ramifications in the unconscious. But even their unconscious symbolic meanings did not fully explain their creative potency. They are mainly images of suffering and death deeply embedded in sado-masochistic phantasy and centred round Frazer's theme of the 'Dying God'. For their role as creative catalysts their infantile symbolism mattered but little; as they entered the creative process they even lost their burden of anxiety and guilt. Marion Milner says: 'the still glow that surrounded some of these images in my mind, images of the burning god, of Adonis and Osiris, did it come because they

satisfied subreptitiously some crude infantile desire that I ought to have left behind long ago? I could not believe that it was so, for I had enough psycho-analytical experience to recognize the feeling of disreputable desires But the kind of thinking that brought these other images was of a quite different quality, it had the feeling of greatest stillness and austerity.' Of course, the guilty satisfaction of the id may coincide with the creative changes within the ego; in Marion Milner's words, it is 'quite possible that the image of killing the human representative of a god could directly satisfy primitive desires to inflict pain, or to destroy authority that thwarted one's desires; but at the same time it could simply foreshadow the truth of a purely psychic process for which no more direct language was available,' that is to say, the process of creative change within the ego, or more specifically the participation of self-destructive (ego) instincts in that process.

It is strange that so many creative minds today should still derive so much inspiration from Frazer's anthropological speculations. When he first put forward the archetype of the Dying God,—Osiris, Adonis, Attis and all the others,—he hoped that he had found the primitive content of religion from which all later more complex religious beliefs would have evolved. When he wrote, half a century ago, cultural anthropology was still dominated by Darwin's discovery of evolution; cultural anthropologists tried to do for the prehistoric evolution of the human spirit what physical anthropologists had done for the evolution of the human body; they tried to reconstruct the primitive origins of the various branches of culture. Today the search for cultural 'origins' is discredited and Frazer's work stands neglected by his fellow anthropologists; not so, however, by poets, artists and other creative minds for whom Frazer's imagery has lost none of its appeal.

I feel that the wheel of scientific fashion may turn once again. It may be true that Frazer's attempt at reconstructing the origin of religion has failed; but his real discovery goes beyond his conscious project; it shows that the theme

of the Dying God is suffused into an unlimited number of cultural institutions. His discovery of unity behind superficial diversity does not so much point to a common origin in prehistory, as to a common root in the unconscious. It appears that any creative stimulus whether underlying religion, or social growth, or the development of art and even science, has this common unconscious denominator.

Freud knew and admired Frazer's work; but apart from occasional reference (e.g. in *The Theme of the Three Caskets*) he did not try to evaluate the universality of the Dying-God theme, perhaps because he himself had independently found the universal theme of Western religion and social institutions in the Oedipus Complex. Freud also proffered a specific 'oceanic' ego condition as the root of all religious experience. We now know that an oceanic condition is found in any creative activity. As Marion Milner pointed out in a recent paper (12), the oceanic fusion between inner and outer world is needed for successful symbol formation; the lack of differentiation in the oceanic state leads to new symbolic equations, and to new creativeness. Freud would have thus described both the source of creativeness in the id - the Oedipus Complex - and the ego condition specific for creativity - the oceanic state. These two aspects of creativeness do not correspond genetically. The imagery of the Oedipus situation presupposes clear differentiation between the roles of father, mother and child, and is far removed from the lack of differentiation in the oceanic fusion.

The imagery centred round the Dying-God theme comes far nearer to this undifferentiated state. Not only does the mother imago—Isis, Kybele, Astarte—stand alone opposite her dead son lover, but their images are interchangeable indicating a lack of sharp differentiation between them. Freud's highly significant contribution to the Dying-God theme was to extend it to fully inverted situations: the image of Lear, carrying his dead daughter Cordelia, stands for the Mother Goddess carrying her dead son, the Walkyrie carrying the dead warrior. In my view, Orpheus conducting Eurydice from death also inverts the situation of the Death

Goddess conducting her son to death. (Unless one takes account of the increasing lack of differentiation in near-oceanic imagery, interpretation is bound to go astray; I hope to give a fuller description of structural levels in imagery in a forthcoming book.)

The sado-masochistic content of the Dying-God theme, its voluntary acceptance of self-destruction, appears directly related to the structural disintegration of imagery on the oceanic level. We now understand Marion Milner when she said that the Dying-God theme did not so much represent id phantasy, as certain ineffable changes in the ego during the onset of creativeness which she aptly calls creative 'surrender'. What is felt emotionally as a surrender to self-destruction in the image of the Dying God is really a surrender to the disintegrating action of low-level imagery which dissolves the hardened surface clichés while consciousness sinks towards an oceanic level.

Long ago, Silberer described this double aspect of imagery as related both to the id and the ego. The reveries during falling asleep may symbolize id phantasy, but at the same time they may reflect the changes of the ego in transition to the sleeping state. I myself found that whenever I resisted falling asleep, images tended to become turbulent and unstable, sometimes catastrophic in content, in contrast to the calm imagery of a gradually sinking consciousness. Similarly, the creative state if unresisted (in a mental gesture of 'surrender'), may come smoothly and at once acquire the austere stillness of which Marion Milner speaks; it will then lack the chaotic savagery which occurs whenever creative 'fury' has to overwhelm the ordinary state of consciousness.

The double aspect of low-level imagery has been implicitly appreciated by other writers. Bertram Lewin, in his exposition of the 'dream screen', referred to the lack of definite content as well as of structure in certain dream images; these at first sight appear merely an empty billowing screen waiting to be filled with more definite structure and content. Lewin ingenuously suggested that this screen has to be related to a very primitive state of ego function-

ing during the oral stage when the child perceived the mother's breast not as part of a solid body, but as a disembodied film billowing in empty space. The failure to see the mother as a solid object points to a near-oceanic state of perception (see my theory of plastic perception later on).

It is difficult, if not impossible, to visualize such undifferentiated imagery in the normal state of consciousness; hence the impression of emptiness. Primitive imagery of low differentiation will act very disruptively on ego functioning, particularly if the disintegration of surface functions is resisted. The emotional experience of self-destruction then corresponds to genuine psychic reality. I am inclined to attribute great significance to Ida Macalpine's and R. A. Hunter's views on the disruptive effect of bisexual phantasies of procreation where sex differentiation becomes suspended and the roles of id and external world become reversed. (The husbandless mother of the Dying God is, of course, related to a primeval bisexual creator.) The writers argue—in my view convincingly—that the famous schizophrenic Schreber defended himself not so much against an unconscious homosexuality, as Freud thought, as against the ego-disruptive effect of a phantasy where he was neither man nor woman, but some sort of primeval hermaphroditic being destined to give birth to a new mankind. This phantasy, apart from its relation to the Dying-God theme, approaches the lack of differentiation in the oceanic state where a single ego literally contains, or creates, the entire universe.

Normal surface consciousness with its precise, narrow focus cannot surrender to such undifferentiated phantasy, and the fear of self-destruction adhering to the phantasy is partly explained by its threat to the surface functions. Hence the vision also resists verbalization. It proves Schreber's genius that he was in fact able to verbalize his phantasies during his recovery. No doubt, he had to subject them to some kind of secondary elaboration which he himself called only "approximately" correct, in order to make them comprehensible to the surface mind, as we have to do with all low-level memories, dreams, daydreams and creative visions.

(I will later argue that the main function of secondary elaboration is to remove the ego-disruptive effect of low-level imagery.) But even so Schreber would have first to surrender his healing surface mind to the threat of renewed disruption. This surrender is not altogether dissimilar to the 'creative surrender', particularly as we must accept Schreber's autobiography as creative work of a high order. His achievement is not diminished by the fact that his continuing illness forced him to accept the fate of the Dying God, that is to say, the id-aspect of his phantasy, when he connived in being emasculated in order to recreate mankind in his role of a bisexual being. What mattered for his creativeness was his facing of the ego-disruptive effect of his phantasy.

Eric Simenauer tells us that Rainer Maria Rilke also suffered from bisexual phantasies of procreation which he at first resisted. He met Lou Andreas-Salomé, the friend of Nietzsche and Freud; she encouraged him to surrender to his phantasies. Simenauer claims that only after this surrender did Rilke become a true poet; he was able to verbalize unspeakable phantasies without disguise. His *Book of Hours* contains the prayer for the appearance of the true hermaphrodite to give birth to the God of Death. Rilke exclaims fervently: 'give the last proof to us, make the crown of your strength appear and give us man's real motherhood.' Anatomical details of this strange mother are not omitted. The point, as in the case of Schreber, is that the creative effect of Rilke's surrender does not lie in an acceptance of homosexuality, but in the submission to the ego-disruptive effect of the phantasy involving great amounts of anxiety. Unlike Schreber, Rilke does not articulate his phantasy into precise, obscene imagery, but succeeds in keeping its undifferentiated ambiguity; he is so able to express at the same time also the poet's longing for true creativeness which is felt as motherhood. (See later the dangers of a secondary elaboration into unambiguous precise surface imagery.)

Robert Graves gives us what almost amounts to a recipe

for poetic creativeness on very similar lines. He paraphrases the Dying-God theme in the image of the White Goddess who kills her son-lover. The poet has to submit to this death in love whereupon the cruel Goddess will turn into the Muse and give him creativeness. If Graves proclaims all true poetry to be love songs to the killing Goddess, he does not—and this is the often repeated point—elevate sado-masochistic phantasy to the sole theme of poetry, but proclaims the creative value of an undifferentiated imagery where love, birth and death becomes a single theme.

Freud studied the structural difference between different levels of ego functioning in his investigation of the secondary dream elaboration. While in the creative surrender the undifferentiated low-level imagery overwhelms the articulate surface imagery, the opposite holds good for the secondary dream elaboration; there the conflict between divergent structural principles ends in the victory of the articulate surface functions. When, after waking, we try to remember a dream, the surface mind will automatically cast the fluid and indefinite dream images into a more precise mould; gaps are filled and incoherent details eliminated. Admittedly, the censorship of the superego will guide this articulation process so as to repress the traces of unconscious dream phantasy; but this interference of the id-superego conflict does not alter the fact that the transformation of the dream imagery is inevitable, owing to the conflict between two structural principles inherent in ego functioning. This is a conflict within the ego which could well be called 'autonomous' (by analogy with Hartmann's concept of autonomous ego functions) in the sense that this dynamic ego tension or conflict can be usefully studied and described without reference to id-superego conflict.

The 'resistance' against the disruptive effect of low-level imagery is equally autonomous from id-superego conflict, and the deep anxiety—often masked by ego rigidity—which may be aroused by the threatening break-through of low-level imagery, may arise independently of any resistance or anxiety which the sado-masochistic id phantasy attaching to

this imagery may call up. As we have seen, the resistance and anxiety are directed against a catastrophic shift of consciousness to an undifferentiated near-oceanic level. This shift exaggerates a basic rhythm inherent in ego functioning; shallower and quicker shifts between different structural levels constantly occur in normal ego activity, but go unnoticed. No spectacular disruption and anxiety arise from the continuous oscillations. I have followed Varendonek, Schilder and recent writing on Gestalt psychology in assuming a split-second oscillation of perception (3). Varendonek, without the help of laboratory tests, concluded that every single perception is preceded by a forgotten moment of dream-like hallucination which is repressed as soon as the articulate rational image emerges into consciousness (18). Later laboratory experiments confirmed this view; the exposure of images is reduced to split-seconds when no articulate image can be formed; Schilder interpreted the dream-like distortion and ambiguity of these tachistoscopic glimpses as primitive, undifferentiated types of perception similar in structure to infantile vision (14). If the split-second exposure is still more cut down below a certain threshold, conscious perception fails altogether and the projection screen remains empty, for the surface mind that is. It was found that observers still reacted to them as though they had unconsciously (subliminally) perceived them. Guesses as to the possible content of the unseen exposures produced a significant number of correct or unconsciously related solutions. Though the superego may well influence the symbolic distortion of these guesses, it cannot explain the repression of low-level perception as such. It appears that the consciously perceived distortion and diffusion of split-second exposures increases near the threshold to such an extent that conscious articulation fails altogether. We have to describe this as a 'structural repression' inherent in the stratification of ego functioning, which is autonomous from the superego's repression, just as we had described the anxiety and resistance against low-level imagery purely in terms of structural ego conflict without reference to id and superego. The

existence of a structural repression explains why we know so little about low-level perceptions whatever their content; if they are allowed to penetrate into consciousness at all they may appear empty as does the dream screen to the average dreamer.

Varendonck, already, recognized the structural similarity of tachistoscopic glimpses and the more profound oceanic vision of the creative state. There the normal ego oscillation is enlarged into a catastrophic breaking up of the surface clithés during the creative surrender, and the slower rhythm swings down to the oceanic level where all differentiation ceases. Hence flexibility of ego functioning is the essence of creativeness; the artist is at home on many levels of the mind and can make his consciousness regress at will. I have described in a recent paper (2) how the painter periodically diffuses his narrow focus into a broader, apparently empty stare through which he is able to comprehend the entire structure of his work down to the smallest detail within a single glance, an impossible feat for surface vision. What on the surface seems an empty stare, really, on an unconscious level, teems with undifferentiated imagery which will give birth to a new flow of invention.

The creative use of imagery, then, depends on the free flexible ego rhythm swinging out between widely distant levels. Images will be constantly immersed into oceanic undifferentiation and brought up again to the surface in a newly articulated shape, a new symbol for a cluster of unconscious images with which it was brought into contact. It is in this manner that I understand Marion Milner's assertion (12) when she says that the first stage in the creative use of symbols, must be a temporary giving up of the discriminating (differentiating) ego which stands apart and tries to see things objectively and rationally and without emotional colouring. When this surface ego is abandoned, the way to oceanic undifferentiation is open. The imagery sinks to a lower structural level where it loses its precise definition and sharp boundaries, and merges with other images into new symbolic equations; then as the ego rhythm

rebounds, the melted image recrystallizes and reassumes an independent existence, while, on the lower level, it still remains equated with, or diffused into, the other images which it now merely 'symbolizes'. A symbol will remain usable and creative only by being constantly remoulded in the interaction between different levels of ego functioning.

We understand now why ego rigidity, which interferes with the free swinging out of the ego rhythm, will also interfere with the successful use of symbols and with creativity in general. As mentioned in the beginning, art teaching can break this deadlock by resolving ego rigidity and the unconscious anxiety masked behind it. That educational methods should succeed in this, is perhaps explained by our assumption that the ego conflict underlying the rigidity can arise independently of id conflict and can therefore also be resolved without touching the id conflict. Marion Milner showed how a gesture of surrender may overcome the rigidity of surface functions by exposing them to the disruption by low-level imagery. Of course, a pathogenic id conflict may reinforce the dissociation of low-level imagery; if the imagery serves to symbolize pathogenic id drives, the ego's rigidity and resistance against low-level imagery will also serve as a defence against the id. This need not make the art teacher's task hopeless. If an ill artist is able to tolerate great amounts of anxiety and face his id conflict, he still may be capable to perform the creative surrender, integrate his low-level imagery with his surface functions and thereby resolve a creative sterility based on the dissociation of his ego functions. Then the pathological id conflict will noisily dominate his consciousness and the misleading impression is aroused that an artist's creativeness comes from id conflict and neurotic illness; this impression makes artists fear undergoing psychoanalytical treatment and cherish their neurosis. But their fear is only justified inasmuch as the psychoanalytical resolution of id conflict may well leave behind an autonomous ego conflict with its sterilizing effect on creativeness. The art teacher, on the other hand, must tread wearily in softening the student's rigidity, expressed in his all too care-

ful, all too deliberate use of his medium; in the beginning a less controlled, more spontaneous handling of the medium may bring on overwhelming anxieties which were hidden behind the ego rigidity. Marion Milner in her artistic beginnings did not have the aid of an understanding teacher; in her second and third "Joanna Field" books she reports the severe anxieties which she had to face after she had abandoned clichés imagery in a catastrophic reversal of ego functioning (5, 6). The creative surrender is not always so dramatic a gesture. The art teacher will gradually lead his student towards freedom, trying all the way to gauge intuitively the amount of anxiety the pupil can bear and the integration of ego functioning already achieved (2).

I have said the the sado-masochistic imagery accompanying the creative surrender conforms with psychic reality. If the surface functions are too rigid their collapse may indeed lead to total ego disintegration. This often happens with schizophrenic imagery which is over-concrete, over-precise, over-rigid. It would be wrong to consider the precise concreteness of schizophrenic imagery as primitive in the sense that it corresponds to an infantile, normally unconscious mode of ego functioning; the opposite is nearer the truth. The schizophrenic cannot tolerate the undifferentiation of primitive low-level imagery because to him the normal periodic disintegration of surface imagery means total ego destruction; indeed when a schizophrenic artist's creative spell ends, due to a worsening of his illness, his rigid precise imagery crumbles away without transition into complete structureless chaos. Marion Milner, in her paper given to the 19th International psychoanalytical Congress 1955 (13), showed that excessive fear of undifferentiation, particularly of a confusion between the body openings, can prevent the ego's regression to an oceanic state and so preclude a creative use of symbols. A vicious circle can be set up; the ego rigidity prevents the oscillation of ego functions between different structural levels and so leads to a progressing dissociation between surface and depth functions, and to an increasing anxiety lest the surface ego be overwhelmed when-

ever low-level functions are stirring. A similar anxiety be-sets certain patients suffering from insomnia; they cannot relax conscious ego control because, unconsciously, they equate the temporary lapse of surface functions with death itself. A certain modicum of dissociation between surface and depth functions is inevitable as a result of the secondary elaboration processes transforming symbols into cliché which will become independent from unconscious phantasy. My point is that creativity is improved to the extent to which the dissociation can be overcome. We could speak of a 'horizontal split' in the rigid ego structure which is remedied by setting free the oscillation between the dissociated levels of ego functioning, thereby leading to a new 'vertical integration' of the ego.

It is the undifferentiated structure of low-level imagery and not its sado-masochistic content which brings creative-ness. If through secondary elaboration such images are cast into concrete and precise Gestalt, they may turn into perverted or criminal phantasy and bring moral degradation instead of inspiration. Schreber's phantasies verged on a concrete wish for castration, while Rilke preserved some of the ambiguity inherent in undifferentiated imagery which prevented it from becoming a motif for purposeful behaviour. Marion Milner comments on the perennial abuse of creative imagery in organized popular religions and in the self-consciously archaistic cults of National-Socialism; 'the whole history of popular religions could . . . be looked upon as a materialization of the image; and once it was no longer looked upon as a truth of spirit, but instead a truth of external fact, then it became the instrument of all kinds of exploitation, lustful, political, social, the instrument of crudest infantile desire . . .'

The creative mind will unceasingly discard the secondary elaborations of his creative imagination, but he cannot prevent the secondary elaboration from taking place; it is inevitable owing to the constant rhythmical interaction between different levels of ego functioning. As in the secondary dream elaboration, the surface mind will automatically focus

on the undifferentiated images emerging into consciousness and recast them in its own precise mould. It will thereby deprive them of their original disruptive effect, but at the same time also of their creative power. No creative image can possibly retain its catalyst function for any length of time so that the creative mind will remain for ever on the look-out for new potent imagery. Marion Milner, in her book, takes us right inside this eternal search; image after image is brought up from a rich storehouse of dreams, myths and childhood memories, each with a new promise of final revelation; but in the end we are told that the quest was all and the answer nothing. We are left with a fine sense of despair which, however, is a good beginning for the attitude of surrender, a letting go of all purpose and planning and a growing trust in the guidance of the unconscious ego.

WHITE LINE

The creative surrender has two features which are of theoretical interest. At first sight they seem to contradict each other; the surrender brings a deepening of the reality sense, but at the same time it possesses a manic quality, a feeling of oceanic, cosmic bliss which strangely contrasts with the imagery of suffering and death. Uncreative rigid personalities often suffer from a flatness of the reality experience which, in my view, is due to the horizontal ego split. In my analysis of artistic perception (3) I expanded Freud's explanation of the vividness attaching to certain dream images so as to cover any kind of perception; the plastic vividness of perception in general would depend on its extension into the depth of the unconscious ego. The more unconscious material goes into a perception the more vivid it will appear consciously. Now, a horizontal dissociation of ego functioning will isolate surface perception from its unconscious matrix; imagery will be pressed into existing cliché unnourished by unconscious phantasy. The result is that perception becomes flat and unreal. This is well brought out by the facts of depersonalized vision. Depersonalization splits off and ejects the unconscious substructure of our

imagery; hence the wonderful allover clarity of depersonalized vision, no dark corners and nooks are left in the peripheral field of vision where unconscious phantasy normally seeps through unobserved (Devereux has first drawn attention to the relation of peripheral vision to unconscious phantasy). But at the same time, depersonalized vision is flat and unreal. We understand now why the creative surrender—where the unconscious substructure erupts and ejects the surface clichés—will give us a deepened sense of external reality.

The creative surrender will also advance our understanding of psychic reality through the emotional experience of self-destruction. We have seen that the periodic disintegration of surface functions in the creative state involves a genuine act of psychic self-destruction from which the uncreative somehow shirks away. This self-destruction remains emotionally unnoticed as long as the self-destructive phase of ego functioning is smoothly absorbed into the ego oscillation between different levels; then the death instinct working within the ego remains mute as Freud described it. But if ego rigidity has to be resolved by a catastrophic reversal of ego functioning, the radical ejection of the surface ego is emotionally felt as death itself. Marion Milner maintains that the facing of this experience is a test for a full acceptance of death as part of reality. She recalls that in Spanish bullfights the killing of the bull is called 'the moment of truth'. Hanna Segal told me in an oral communication that she considered the emotional acceptance of death as a fact to be a condition of creativeness. In her paper *A Psychoanalytical Approach to Aesthetics* she tells of patients who were impeded in their creative ability for this reason; one patient felt an overwhelming need for preserving her body which she experienced as being half-dead already. In a way all uncreative persons do this quite literally by clinging to their rigid, half-dead clichés at the expense of low-level phantasy which alone could infuse life and richness into their reality experience. It would appear that the emotional realization of death as a fact is not so much a

condition of creativeness as the result of the creative surrender to partial ego-destruction which the uncreative cannot tolerate.

It may seem strange that we should have to surrender our rational surface functions to the irrational depth mind in order to advance our understanding of death and of reality in general. Is it not generally held that only our rational conscious mind, but not the unconscious knows of death? But it is only the unconscious id which ignores time and death; we have seen how the unconscious ego constantly experiences disintegration and death in its rhythm of waking and sleeping, and, more important, in the rhythm of creativeness. Very likely the unconscious ego rhythm gives us also our sense of time and we can thus enlarge Freud's saying that time might be the mode in which the ego works. The uncreative who resists, or flattens, the ego rhythm owing to his deep fear of both the unconscious ego and of death, also denies the flow of time and fails in his emotional acceptance of dying as a fact.

The second already mentioned feature of the creative surrender seems to contradict its value as reality experience; it is its distinct manic quality. The killing of the bull, the sacrifice of the Dying God have no depressive feeling about them; death, once accepted, becomes a feast of cosmic bliss, of liberation from bondage. This manic experience is connected with the ego fusion achieved in creative surrender which heals the ego split—not by ejecting the superego as happens in pathogenic mania—but by ejecting the dissociated surface crust. Adrian Stokes has rightly drawn attention to the constructive role which a manic experience plays in creativity, a role which equals that played by the Depressive Position as described by Melanie Klein (17). The feeling of 'otherness', of precise differentiation, experienced in the Depressive Position, has to be balanced by the manic feeling of 'sameness', of undifferentiation, where the boundaries between outer and inner world melt away. Marion Milner, as already mentioned (12), maintains that the oceanic fusion is a prerequisite for the fusion of images into sym-

bolistic equations and for successful symbol formation in general. A child patient re-enacted in his play the archetypal ritual of the Dying God when he solemnly burned a toy soldier with a deep sense of mystery; this sacrifice meant the creative surrender of the commonsense ego that watches over the boundaries between things and between outer and inner world. Here is the very opposite of a manic denial; here is a scene of communion between consciousness and the undifferentiated matrix of all creative imagery through a bacchantic ritual of sacrifice and death.

I have always felt that an exclusive stress on the Depressive Position, as the source of creative activity, did not take account of the almost biological rhythm between mania and depression, where mania appears on the same level as depression, as a fundamental human attitude. Once we accept this equal status of mania, we are able to discern co-operation rather than antagonism between the polar attitudes: creative depression would lead to an horizontal integration between ego nuclei split vertically on the same structural level, creative mania supplements this healing process by the vertical integration between different ego levels, through overcoming the horizontal split and restoring the free rhythm of ego functioning on which creativity depends.

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Restitution Aspects of the Creative Process⁺

by

Jacques Schnier

Man's unceasing interest and talent in art is attested by archeological and anthropological records dating back to paleolithic times. Today, wherever we turn, wherever we travel, the products of these talents are in clear evidence.

The meaning and origin of man's creative talents have interested philosophers of all ages. Few are the humanists who have not attempted to reveal the secrets of artistic creativity and to categorize the "laws of beauty." (1) Some of them explain creativity as originating in magic, in Divine inspiration, or in a form of madness. Others explain it as reflecting a spiritual quality of life or the beauty of nature. Still others conceive of it as serving the purpose of katharsis—as a release for inner tension—or as a need to express human emotions.

All these theories no doubt offer some partial explanation of creativity. None, however, completely illuminates the meaning or origin of the creative process. Upon critically examining each of them we eventually come face to face with an unanswerable, with an assumption, with some form of *a priori*, hypothetical reasoning. What, for example, is the ultimate meaning of magic, or Divine inspiration? How are the tensions, which find release by way of katharsis, to be explained by these early speculations? What is the nature of "beauty" which forms the basis of so many theories of artistic creativity?

⁺Read before First Unitarian Church, Berkeley, California, January 24, 1957, as introductory lecture in a weekly series, by various artists, entitled: "Human Creativity, Origins and Modes of Expression."

For many philosophers, the common explanation of beauty in art is that it stems from beauty in Nature and that the artist's activity is aimed at recapturing this quality. We need not consider this question of beauty long to realize that any attempt to answer it is beset with serious difficulties. Men probably disagree more about what is beautiful and what is not than they do about most other things. And also, beauty varies considerably with geographical location; what is beautiful to a New Yorker may not be so to an Alaskan Eskimo and probably less so to a native of New Guinea. If beauty were an objective quality of nature like white snow on mountain peaks, morning dew on flowers, or the colors of a sunset sky, perception of beauty would be more or less uniform for all observers. We know, of course, this is not so. Thus, whatever else it may be, beauty is certainly not a definable quality such as the various physical qualities of objects. And, since it cannot be defined as to quality or quantity, it therefore provides us no basis for a scientific explanation of art or creativity.

Because some individuals have a greater share of creativity than others, attempts have been made to account for it solely on the basis of inheritance. Notwithstanding its great appeal as a solution of the problem, this theory has not been adequately proved. One of the weak points of attributing acquired characteristics to inheritance should be obvious when we consider how often an alcoholic son may come from totally abstemious parents, or gifted individuals from parents who were completely insensitive to creative accomplishments or who were emotionally unstable. John Kepler, the famous creative mathematician-philosopher (the forerunner of Newton) came from parents, both of whom were psychotics.

It is to the credit of twentieth century psychology, more specifically to psychoanalysis, that instead of groping with the supernatural or with heredity for answers to creativity, it has turned instead to its basic knowledge regarding the human mind. The result is a theory of creativity, which though strange and startling to some, comes most closely

to satisfying scientific demands. In contrast with early speculations about art and creativity, the psychoanalytic concept is purely an inductive one. It proceeds from a large number of collated or critically examined facts to a general principle. It is built up step by step on the basis of actual experience and observation of human phenomena without the introduction of an *a priori* hypothesis. It, therefore, can appropriately be called a scientific concept in contradistinction to the early philosophical ones.

Psychoanalysis envisages the human mind as possessed of various wishes or instinctual drives seeking gratification. (2) Some of these instincts relate to primordial love impulses, others to aggressive or destructive ones. Because of man's cultural background and the parent-child experiences which are more or less common to all of us, many of these primordial wishes, when set into action, produce internal conflict. The result of this internal conflict is anxiety, fear, tension, or feelings of guilt. Because man is peculiarly intolerant to anxiety or fear arising from within, he has devised an unusual variety of defenses against such feelings. It is these three factors—wishes, anxiety, and defense—which go far in explaining what we call human character and human conduct as well as creativity. (3)

Some of the defenses set up to resolve anxiety appear utterly wasteful, fantastic, and ridiculous. (4) They seem as unreasonable as the self-injuries a person may inflict upon himself as punishment against aggressive impulses towards someone else. Actually, one type of defense against inner conflict results in the development of distressing bodily symptoms. I have reference here to the large group of psychosomatic symptoms of a purely emotional nature, i.e., certain headaches, backaches, gastro-intestinal disturbances, eye-strain, asthma, insomnia, and high blood pressure. Other defenses manifest themselves in rigid and compulsive behavior and the tendency to deny oneself even the most harmless experiences of the enjoyment of life. Obsessive thinking about one's unworthiness is also not uncommon. Obviously, all these methods of resolving inner conflict are as profitless

to the individual as they are valueless to society.

Of all the various defense mechanisms man has at his disposal, there is one, however, which is not only considered normal but is also highly esteemed. This is the mechanism of sublimation whereby the mind uses certain activities that are not only valuable to the personality but are also both sanctioned and honored by society. Society's most highly cherished accomplishments such as science, education, social and political institutions, and the great field of the creative arts are now considered as resulting from successful resolution of instinctual conflicts. (5) A study of the life of Charles Darwin or Vincent Van Gogh reveals the extent to which internal conflict and mental distress can lead to the most sublime achievements of man. Van Gogh stated that there was some power within him clamoring for escape, and if he were not allowed to paint, he would go mad.

The satisfaction resulting from art through sublimation by way of creative activity is exceeded only by the satisfaction of a well adjusted love-life. In turn, the joy and happiness that art brings to the lives of countless art lovers is immeasurable. It is for this reason that art throughout the ages has been held in such high esteem. It is also for this reason, no doubt, that art in the Bible is regarded as wisdom, originating in Divine inspiration. In the Jewish Talmud, the Hebrew word *hakhem*, meaning wise man also means artist.

Investigation of the process of sublimation as related to art reveals certain fundamental underlying features. One of these is the role of unconscious mentation in creative activity. Recognition of the unconscious (what we now call the "id") is not new. Long before its scientific exploration and verification in modern times, philosophers and artists had speculated and commented on the unconscious characteristics of human thinking. Plato and Aristotle made references to a non-conscious aspect of mental life, and the subject continues to intrigue both artist and philosopher alike.

Another feature concerns symbolism in art, i.e., the particular id-meanings of specific ideas, words, objects, or sub-

ject matter of art. (6) Investigation reveals that in most instances, the subject matter of art represents symbols or substitutes for unconscious ideas or for instinctual urges seeking expression. Generally speaking these instinctual urges concern feelings of love or hate, creation or destruction, and infantile cravings supposedly long outgrown. Because these urges are in conflict with what the individual's superego (conscience) considers ethical and moral, they are subjected to repression and achieve a conscious expression only by assuming a changed or disguised form. There is a vast literature on the subject of unconscious symbolism and the possibilities of validation are sufficiently high to lift it completely out of the realm of hypothesis.

Still another feature refers to certain categories of human experiences and conflicts which are ever recurring themes in art. The Oedipus complex, which forms the nucleus of Sophocles' great tragedy "Oedipus Rex," is a striking example of this. Ernest Jones's masterfully penetrating study of Hamlet reveals in a lucid and precise manner the presence of this same complex as the underlying motif of Shakespeare's most famous play. (7) In fact, the struggle against incestuous impulses, dependency, guilt, and aggression is a favorite topic of Western literature from Sophocles to Proust and its role in art is now as well established as any theory in the social sciences.

The features just enumerated are concerned primarily with art content—with the unconscious meaning of theme, plot, or subject matter in art. As such they have little to do with the style or schools of art, or whether the work of art is abstract or representational. In fact, these features are not even the exclusive characteristics of art alone. Many noncreative activities such as dreams or asocial behavior are characterized by exactly the same underlying features. (8) Most juvenile delinquency as well as other valueless behavior patterns derive from unconscious impulses, have symbolic content, and express some common human experience such as the Oedipus complex in either its positive or negative aspects.

The only distinguishing feature that sets art apart from all other activities is its structural and formal characteristics. Although there is general acceptance of this essential feature as a sort of organic kind of unity like that in a living organism whose parts are in vital and structural relationship to the whole, there is no agreement among aestheticians as to its meaning. But if we are to understand artistic creativity it is essential that we know the psychological significance of this characteristic. It is essential that we understand the meaning of composition, unity, form, harmony, or organization. Without knowledge of the purpose of art's balance, rhythm, movement, and echoing parts, we remain in darkness as to the most important distinguishing characteristic of creativity.

Although the following interpretation of the origin and meaning of form in art may seem strange, it has been arrived at through the extensive observation and analysis of children in their play with toys and their work with clay, paints, water, paper, and blocks. (9) The analysis of numerous artists and non-artists corroborates this interpretation. Observation reveals that when a child's aggressive instincts are at their height, he never tires of tearing, cutting, breaking, wetting, and burning all sorts of things like paper, matches, boxes, and toys. Psychoanalysts, with almost monotonous regularity, have elicited from the child that these objects on which he vents his destructive feelings are symbols of his parents and siblings, especially his mother and his mother's body. This is to say, these destructive activities represent imaginary attacks on the mother's body as well as on that of the father, brothers and sisters. The common smashing, tearing and piercing of things with hammering, stabbing, and other blows represent these attacks.

This destructiveness is explained in part as being motivated by the child's impulse to destroy and then to incorporate within himself what he loves. A child loves an object only because it gives him pleasure. So, if what gives him pleasure can be incorporated within himself, he never need fear being deprived of it. The first love-object of all, and

the source of the greatest pleasure for the child, is the mother. Because of this, the child's primitive impulse is to tear and devour her—to assimilate her in a cannibalistic manner—thus assuring himself of this source of pleasure forever. Originally, the child fantasies himself using the weapons of his own primary-sadistic impulses—his teeth, nails and muscles—to achieve his goal. Only later does the common smashing, tearing and piercing become substitutes for the function of these bodily weapons.

Observations of these play situations reveal that with the development of a rudimentary superego, periods of destructiveness alternate with attacks of anxiety. These anxiety attacks result from the child fantasizing that it will be reprimanded or possibly punished for its destructive wishes. The loved objects which the child in fantasy has incorporated within himself are imagined as the punishing agents. Here we have an explanation for the host of voracious witches and female demons who populate the countless fairy tales, the reading of which the child never tires. By projecting his own destructive wishes upon these dangerous, devouring female demons, the child relieves himself of guilt and anxiety. The lifting of anxiety or fear is experienced by the mind as pleasure, and the glee with which children read or listen to gruesome fairy tales is an indication of this process.

Anxiety, however, can be reduced by another method, and this is by the child's constructive activities. As first pointed out by Melanie Klein, whereas a child may formerly have smeared paints, crayons or mud over everything, when anxiety develops, he may begin to paint pictures, write, draw, or model in clay. Or, whereas he formerly had cut up or torn objects to pieces, he may now begin to develop rudimentary forms of creative work by way of designing, constructing, or in the case of a girl, by sewing. These rudimentary organized activities are considered an acknowledgement of the child's destructive impulses and to represent attempts at repairing and restoring the destroyed objects.

The close relationship between destructive and construc-

tive impulses is clearly exemplified in the following art activity of Billy, a six-year-old. The cook in the school cafeteria where he was finger-painting came over and asked him what he was doing and if he was having fun. "Oh yes," he said, "you stay and watch me." He described to her what colors he was putting on. Then she asked him what he was going to paint. "This is going to be you," he said. "Not you, but a tree. See! a tree with the water covering it up. It's raining and one of your children is dying." "That's a tragedy," said the cook, "the dog should come and save her now, shouldn't he?" "No, the dog is washed away, and your house is washed away and you're drowned too." The cook looked rather breathless at this destructive outpouring and the gleam in Billy's eye, as he continued to smear in the finger paint. Continuing, he said, "Now it's going down and you can see a piece of your trunk, here's the back. Now it's stopped raining. See! the rain has stopped. The water is way down and it's all dried up." In the final version of Billy's painting, the cook, her child, her dog, and her house were retrieved from the flood and restored or brought back to life again. (10)

A child's urge to reverse his former destructive impulses implies some necessity to make a unit of the destroyed parts, to infuse this unit with life and to animate it once more. In the process the object becomes perfect, it becomes "pretty" (childhood expression), or, if the organizing activity is in art medium, it becomes "beautiful" (adult expression) and so, a work of art.

Psychoanalytic investigation reveals that the destructive impulses of infancy remain alive in the unconscious mind (the id) of mature individuals. But by means of the creative act one makes a restitution—one atones for these impulses—and thus redeems oneself. Through the work of art, the objects originally destroyed in fantasy are brought back to life. (11) This, no doubt, accounts for the requirement of organic unity, living quality and vitality in a successful work of art. In spirit, the psychoanalytic interpretation of creativity as an act of restitution agrees with that intuitively

arrived at by some artists themselves. Thus, no less gifted a painter than Picasso confesses that, "a painting moves forward to completion by means of a series of destruction." (12) The poet Schiller wrote, "What would live in song immortally, must in life first perish." (13) And Carl Milles the gifted sculptor states that each of the thirty-eight figures in his last great monumental group represents the reunion after death of someone he had known in life. "The last figure I made is a mother holding her child in the air. They both died at the child's birth. The old man leaning down to touch his dogs lived in a cave in France. He wanted no part of civilization. He killed his dogs before he died." This is Milles' idea of heaven. A concerted effort to recreate the dead by means of art is obvious in these lines. (14)

We must not, however, expect to find extensive corroboration of the restitution theory of art in the explanations of the creative process recorded by artists themselves. Rarely is an artist willing or even able to reveal in an undisguised form, his most intimate instinctual feelings. It is for this reason, no doubt, that Keats wrote:

"Beauty is truth, truth beauty,—that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know." (15)

This is a polite Englishman's way of telling us to mind our own business and to desist in our inquisitiveness regarding creativity. This point of view is expressed even more emphatically by Clive Bell who writes: "At this point a query arises, irrelevant indeed, but hardly to be suppressed: 'Why are we so profoundly moved by forms related in a particular way?' The question is extremely interesting, but irrelevant to aesthetics. In pure aesthetics we have only to consider our emotion and its object; for the purposes of aesthetics we have no right, neither is there any necessity, to pry behind the object into the state of mind of him who made it." (16)

Not all artists, however, are unsympathetic to the investigation of their creative process. Compare, for example, Keats' and Bell's statements with the fearlessness of that sensitive writer Robert Louis Stevenson, who claimed that

there was nothing more disenchanting to man than to be shown the springs and mechanisms of art. But, he added, "these disclosures which seem fatal to the dignity of art seem so perhaps only in proportion to our ignorance. . . . Those conscious and unconscious artifices which seem unworthy of the serious artist to employ, were yet, if we had the power to trace them to their hidden springs, indications of a delicacy of the sense finer than we conceive and hints of ancient harmonies in nature." (17) Today, thanks to man's innate inquisitiveness about all mental as well as all physical phenomena, he is learning a little how to trace these conscious and unconscious devices to their hidden springs. He is learning that the dignity of art can never be lessened by any knowledge he can gain about it. And like Stevenson, he is learning to be fearless and guiltless of what goes on in the deep recess of the mind.

Turning now to ancient Greek art, we find a remarkable corroboration of the "restitution theory" in the origin of Greek drama. Extensive documentation shows us that the plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides arose out of ritual dances performed in the flat circular area called the orchestra. Just as in primitive totem ceremonies performed by native tribes all over the world, there were no spectators, only performers. The theme of the ritual dances was the bringing to life of the god Dionysos, who in the form of a bull or a god had previously been slain. The Bouphonia, the "annual ox-murder" of the Athenians is an example of such a ritual performance. (18) All the participants emphatically denied their guilt of the murderous act and finally accused the ax used for the slaughter. Then, having partaken of the animal's flesh, they all acted out his resurrection. For this purpose the animal's hide was stuffed with straw and attached to a plow as if tilling the soil, or the chorus of dancers masquerading as bulls or cows mimicked the movements of the live animal.

In these rituals the dancers acted and thus fantasied themselves as the object which had previously been destroyed. By impersonating the destroyed animal, the dead were made

to live again. Each person who wore the mask or animal skin felt he was, for the time being, the actual reincarnation of the dead and through his rhythmical, pulsating movements, i.e., through his artistry, he created the illusion of the resurrection.

Eventually, from these early ritual performances in which music, dance and verbal response were fused, there grew the more or less independent branches of Greek art. Greek tragedy, for example, evolved from these early resurrection rituals. (19) The name tragedy means goat song (Gr. *tragos*: he-goat, *ōidēs* song) and comes from the Greek chorus who imitated the vicissitudes of Dionysos in goat form. (20)

In time, the symbolization of humans spread from animal to non-animal and eventually to the entire range of experienceable objects. Although most of the Greek dramas retain the half-animal chorus which gives them their names, such as "The Birds," "The Frogs," and "The Wasps" of Aristophanes, we find a chorus of nature spirits appropriately appearing in one of his dramas called "The Clouds." (21) Finally, anything could become a symbol of the person who is first dismembered and then resurrected in order to release guilt feelings. Plants, trees, insects, birds, reptiles, nature features and natural phenomena—all these could now function as unconscious symbols of the destroyed object brought back to life by the vitalizing fires of creativity.

In the category of abstract symbols, circles, triangles, squares, spheres, pyramids, cylinders, and free forms could be employed as representatives of persons or their attributes. This fact should help us in our understanding of the abstract or nonrepresentational art of today, where nonobjective symbols are used to achieve rhythm, life and vitality by way of pure design.

Through his wizardry of infusing rhythm into the abstract shapes used in modern art, as well as into naturalistic forms, such as those preferred by the ancient Greeks, the creative artist is provided with a powerfully effective symbolic means for performing an act of restitution. Through

his magic-like talent for organizing his symbols into an exquisite design or composition he can create the illusion of pulsating life. (22)

According to the restitution theory, the spectator upon viewing the artist's successful creation similarly experiences unconsciously this resurrection. Through his enjoyment of the work of art, he is purged of guilt, feels a decrease of inner tensions, and a heightening of his self-esteem. It is no small wonder that we can solicit the great minds of history in support of the opinion that art undoubtedly contributes as much to the wholesome and real happiness of mankind as any of the other devices invented for pleasure.

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The Dream of Benedict de Spinoza

by

Lewis S. Feuer

A metaphysical system is a projection which issues from the deepest anxieties of men. Perhaps the most truthful way of writing a philosophy would be in the form of an autobiography. We would understand why a man saw reality as he did, what traits of reality he wished to repress, what he was motivated to exaggerate. But philosophers are great rationalizers. Each of them prefers to see his philosophy as *the* rational, scientific system. Each of them erects an edifice of argument, but tends to be most sparing as to personal details concerning himself. We are permitted to see only the finished play, never the actor as he really is, adjusting his make-up, rehearsing his lines. But here and there, in uncensored asides, in letters to their friends, in dreams, we get an invaluable clue which leads into the labyrinth of the philosopher's unconscious life. We even get a glimpse of components in the philosopher's unconscious which rebel against his own conscious metaphysics, and condemn it as false. And such is the one dream which Spinoza recorded. It was in a letter to his friend Balling in 1664:

"I can confirm and at the same time explain what I have just said by something which happened to me at Rhynsburg last winter. When I awoke one morning, when the sky was already growing light, from a very heavy dream, the images which had come to me in my dream remained as vividly before my eyes as if they had been real things, especially the image of a certain black and scabby Brazilian whom I had never seen before. This image for the most part disappeared when, in order to divert myself with something else, I fixed my eyes on a book or some other object: but as soon as I again turned my eyes away from such an object

and fixed them on something inattentively, the image of the same Ethiopian again appeared with the same vividness, and that again and again until gradually it disappeared from my presence." (16, p. 139-140)

This dream made a tremendous impression on Spinoza. A half-year after its occurrence, he could still recall vividly its dominant threatening image. What were the circumstances of this dream? Shortly after his excommunication from the Amsterdam Jewish synagogue in 1656, Spinoza went to live among the Collegiant-Mennonite community at Rhynsburg. The Mennonites were a pacifist mystical group, with a vaguely communistic heritage derived from their anabaptist forerunners. The community at Rhynsburg in their theology was much akin to the English Quakers, though they expressed their mysticism in the language of Descartes. Pieter Balling was a noble representative of this group. In 1662 he wrote a tract on his spiritual mysticism and self-discovery, *The Light on the Candlestick*, which later found its place in English Quaker literature. (14, p. 713-723) He was devoted to Spinoza, and prepared the Dutch translation of his first published work, *The Principles of Descartes' Philosophy*. At this time, furthermore, Balling was the intermediary between Spinoza and a society of young men who met at Amsterdam to discuss Spinoza's ideas. Balling would bring them portions of Spinoza's writings when he went to Amsterdam on his business journeys, and the society would send back its questions to Spinoza. They were a bold, questioning group of minds, and they looked to Spinoza for intellectual leadership in their struggle with Calvinist orthodoxy. As one of them, Simon de Vries, wrote to Spinoza: " . . . under your leadership we may be able to defend the truth against those who are superstitiously religious or even Christian, and to stand firm against the onslaught of the whole world." (16, p. 102)

Now in 1664, Balling's child had sickened and died. He turned, grief-stricken, to Spinoza, and wrote how he had heard omens of his child's death even when the child was well, - "Sobs like those it uttered when it was ill and just

before it died." Spinoza wrote with warmth to comfort his friend: "It has caused me no little sadness and anxiety, although this has certainly diminished now that I dwell on your good sense. . . . But my anxiety daily grows more; and therefore I beseech and adjure you by our friendship not to mind writing to me fully." Then Spinoza undertook to discuss the significance of Balling's premonitions. Are dreams omens of some future event? He compares Balling's experience with his own dream, and says, "Your case was an omen, but mine was not." Spinoza's theory of dreams, as we analyze it, seems to have been largely a resistance device to prevent the analysis of his own dream. His repression-mechanism, as we shall see, is inconsistent with his own philosophy, and indicates an anxiety as to the underlying significance of the symbol of the "black and scabby Brazilian."

Spinoza distinguishes between two kinds of dreams—those which have a bodily cause and those which have a mental cause. Of the first kind, he writes: "We find that fevers and other physical changes are the causes of delirium, and that those who have thick blood imagine nothing but quarrels, troubles, murders, and the like." Dreams of this kind, Spinoza affirms, cannot (in our terms) be psychoanalyzed, for they are not the outcome of psychological anxieties. But the second kind of dreams are those which are largely determined by "the constitution of the soul". In this variety, the imagination "follows the traces of the intellect and concatenates its images and words in a certain order . . . so much so that there is almost nothing that we can understand of which the imagination does not form some image from the trace thereof." These dreams do indicate basic anxieties, and in that sense, can be regarded as ominous of some future event. Spinoza states the distinction clearly, "all the effects of the imagination that proceed from physical causes can never be omens of future events, because their causes involve no future thing. But the effects of imagination, or images that derive their origin from the constitution of the mind can well be omens of some future

event; since the Mind can confusedly have a presentiment of something yet to come."

Now Spinoza held that his own dream was not an omen because it was the consequence of purely physical causes. Yet, from the standpoint of Spinoza's philosophy, it is an error to say that a dream can have either a mental or physical cause. According to Spinoza's metaphysics, the order and connection of extended modes is the same as that of ideas. Every object, Spinoza held, was both a mental and physical reality. Nature could be regarded from the standpoints of either the attributes of thought or extension, and every constituent within it was at once both a mental and physical mode; every event is psychophysical. Within the confines of his system, Spinoza is not justified in saying that the imaginations of delirium issue from physical causes. Rather he should have said that what takes place is a weakening of mental inhibitions corresponding to the weakening of certain physical structures. And the images which emerge in delirium would be just as much "omens" as those of ordinary dreams. For they would reveal anxieties hitherto repressed in the unconscious. Spinoza's assertion that non-ominous dreams are purely physically caused can therefore be regarded as a symptom of his own resistance to an analysis of his unconscious. For his argument that his dream was non-ominous rests on a blatant departure from the psychophysical parallelism which is so central to his system of the universe. And when a philosopher, so loyal to the geometrical method as Spinoza was, is led to such an obvious inconsistency in applying his doctrine, we may infer that the phenomenon in question has awakened strong resistances, strong enough to bend his metaphysics into contradiction rather than yield.

We are therefore led to enquire: what was the significance of the traumatic "black and scabby Brazilian" in Spinoza's dream?

The Holland of Spinoza's time was beginning to awaken to the problems of race. Dutch involvement in the slave trade was great, and on rare occasions, a Negro might even

be seen in Amsterdam. People were beginning to speculate as to why Negroes were colored. The great founder of microscopy, Leeuwenhoek, citizen of Amsterdam in 1684, recorded: "there are many people in our country (as I have often expressed) who are firmly convinced that the Moors become black merely by rubbing their bodies with a certain oil, for they say the children are red when they come into the world, just like our children." (7, Vol. IV, p. 249) The problem had begun to interest scientists as well. The secretary of the English Royal Society asked Leeuwenhoek in 1677 to "closely examine the skin of Moors, also called negroes." (7, Vol. II, p. 239) The Dutch scientist promised to do so when an occasion offered. Seven years later, in 1684, Leeuwenhoek finally reported to the Royal Society that he had made observations on "several parts of the arms of a black Moorish girl, about 13 years old, . . ." She was the descendant of West African Negroes who had been enslaved in Brazil. "But a certain old lady of this town to whom the grandmother of this Moorish girl had been a slave in Brazil, told me that this Moorish woman was the child of parents from Angola, . . ." Leeuwenhoek dutifully reported that the popular theory of color differences was mistaken: "it is impossible to dye the scales forming the epidemis, so as to keep it black, . . ." And he found that the Negro skin "consisted of no other parts than little scales, . . . in the manner I have described of my own skin," but less transparent. (7, Vol. IV, p. 245-247)

Spinoza was a microscopist even as Leeuwenhoek, and they both had one common friend, the good Lutheran pastor, Dr. Cordes, whose sermons Spinoza much admired. (4, p. 176-177) There is no indication, however, that the Negro was among Spinoza's scientific interests, and Negroes, as we have seen, were exceedingly rare on the streets of Amsterdam. The "black and scabby Brazilian" was, as Spinoza said, one "whom I had never seen before." We must look for the genesis of the traumatic symbol elsewhere. And we find it, as far as available evidence can suggest, in the tragic circumstances which surrounded Spinoza's excommunication.

The figure of a black Brazilian had loomed in one terrifying episode in the history of the Dutch Jewish community.

The Amsterdam Jews had a large share in the slave trade. They had made immense profits, but they also experienced the horror of a slave uprising. The history of the Dutch Jewish community in Brazil has only recently been studied, but its salient facts are now established. It was in 1630 that the Dutch West India Company conquered Pernambuco. Jewish holdings in this company were extensive; although only four per cent of the shareholders were Jewish, they evidently owned a much more considerable proportion of the stock. The Company's guarantee of religious liberty induced the migration of several hundred Jewish families, many of whom came from Holland. (19, p. 1-2)

The slave trade, in which the Company held a monopoly, was extremely lucrative. The Company made a net profit of as much as 240% on each slave. Among the largest plantation owners, slave-holders, and slave traders in the valley of Pernambuco were Jews. Jorge Homen Pinto, for instance, owned 370 slaves and 1000 oxen. (2, p. 49, 63, 76) The Jewish community itself was supported partially by a tax on the slave trade. A rule of the community in 5409 (1648-1649 A.D.) provided that "Negroes bought from the Company shall be taxable at five soldos a piece." (19, p. 74) The conversion of Negroes to Judaism had to be discouraged because of the Biblical laws against the enslavement of fellow Israelites. The Jewish community therefore enacted a law prohibiting the circumcision of Gentiles without the prior consent of the Mahamad, under penalty of fine and excommunication. The ordinance was especially designed for application to slaves: "And if that person be a slave, he shall not be circumcised without first having been freed by his master, so that the master shall not be able to sell him from the moment the slave will have bound himself (to Judaism)." (19, p. 69, 22) To circumcise a slave, one

would have to free him. The slave holder would hesitate at this step.

The Brazilian Jewish community was not destined to survive. The Portuguese fought to regain their colony. Their cruelty towards Jewish prisoners was frightful even for that age so that the Dutch asked: "Why are Jewish prisoners of war martyred unto death in so beastly a manner? Are they worse people than we?" When Isaac de Castro, of Amsterdam, fell into the hands of the Portuguese in Brazil, he was sent to Lisbon for trial before the Inquisition. Upon his refusal to renounce his faith, De Castro was burnt at the stake in 1647 in the presence of three fellow Jewish captives. (2, p. 94, 96)

Finally, in 1654, came catastrophe. The Portuguese captured Pernambuco. They were aided by a slave uprising. Negro troops under a Negro commander fought beside the Portuguese in what was for them a war of liberation. Henrique Diaz, the Negro leader, became the colony's governor, and was further rewarded by the Portuguese commander in 1656 with a deed to the lot of the Jewish cemetery. (19, p. 56) The Synagogues on the Street of the Jews were given as spoils to the man who, in 1645, had led a rebellion of the Portuguese and Brazilians against the Dutch.

The "black and scabby Brazilian" of whom Spinoza dreamt, was, I shall try to show, probably none other than Henrique Diaz, Negro commander of the slave insurrectionists. In personal appearance, Diaz' blackness marked him out from other fairer Negroes. (11, p. 176) His warlike qualities were a byword among the Dutch. He gloried in the fierceness of his slave followers. This New World Spartacus described his Negro legion of gladiators in 1647: "This regiment is composed of four nations: Minas, Ardas, Angolas, and Creoles. These last are so malevolent that they know neither fear nor duty; the Minas so fierce that what they cannot come at with their brawn they come at with their name; the Ardas so fierce that they would slash everything at a single stroke; and the Angolas so robust that no labor tires them." (5, p. 301) Such was the rebel leader

and his warriors. They had a cause to inspire them; slavery under the Calvinist Dutch was more cruel than under the Catholic Portuguese. (18, p. 65) Captured at one time by the Dutch, Diaz was released because the Dutch thought "because he was a Negro slave he wasn't worth the cost of feeding." He returned to battle over the years, was wounded, and finally triumphant, became a member of the Portuguese nobility and holder of the *Ordem de Christo*. (11, p. 91, 176)

Among the Dutch Jewish subjects in Brazil, none had been braver than the Rabbi Isaac de Fonseca Aboab. Now he, like most of the Brazilian Jews, returned sadly to Amsterdam where his co-religionists at once welcomed him to a rabbinate in their synagogue. For Isaac, prior to his departure for Brazil, had served the Amsterdam community for many years as Rabbi and teacher. He was an admired Talmudist, and an eloquent preacher. The community preferred him to the more restless Menasseh ben Israel, who was indeed briefly excommunicated in 1640 for offending the community's wealthy magnates. Aboab probably presided at that ceremony. (13, p. 49-50, 56) It was the same Rabbi Isaac de Fonseca Rboab who on July 25, 1656, read to the Jewish community the decree excommunicating the young Baruch de Spinoza from its midst. (3, p. 391)

Ten years before, Rabbi Aboab had stood with the besieged Jews in the siege of Pernambuco. A Portuguese expedition, inspired by priestly words, had in 1646 launched an attack with the hope of exterminating the Jews. Rabbi Aboab ordered his countrymen to fast, he exhorted them to stand their ground, he prayed to God. The Jews' hour of trial was great. Many of them died in battle, many starved. Famine had almost forced them to surrender, when at the last moment, on the ninth of Tammuz, a Dutch fleet of rescue appeared on the horizon. The Jews were saved by the deliverer as their ancestors at the Red Sea. They sang: "Who is like Thee among the gods, O Lord!" All these events Aboab had commemorated in a poem of history and thanksgiving. (6, p. 128)

Rabbi Aboab was a man of culture. His library included Latin, Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese works; Homer, Virgil, Aristophanes, Plutarch, Cicero, the church fathers, Montaigne, Hobbes and Machiavelli had a place on his shelves. (9, p. 210-211) He was not the sort of man to deny to Spinoza the right to study Latin and Descartes. But to Rabbi Aboab, the Jews were God's Chosen People; the Portuguese and Brazilians, he had written, were "an abomination of Amalek." Rabbi Aboab had known the exiled wanderings of his people. Born in Portugal in 1605, he had been taken to France as a child, then studied at Amsterdam. He had seen his people driven and unwelcome in the New World and the Old. And now before him and his fellow-judges on the Beth Din, he heard witnesses testify that Spinoza scoffed at the Jews as "superstitious people born and bred in ignorance, who do not know what God is, and who nevertheless have the audacity to speak of themselves as His people, to the disparagement of other nations, . . ." (20, p. 48) This young man of twenty-four was proud and bold. He was something new in the history of Jewry. He was the first of modern Jews to be taking his stand in the ranks of a radical political party. He had learned his Latin from Van dan Ende, a sceptical former Jesuit, who railed at religions, was called "lucianist", and engaged in revolutionary political plots. In 1674, Spinoza's master was executed for trying to help start a revolution in France which aimed to found a democratic republic with liberal welfare legislation. Spinoza's personal friends were not Jews but apparently Collegiants or Mennonites, strange mystics, who were pacifist in politics, without an organized ministry, vaguely communistic in their economic outlook. This young man of twenty-four was also an admirer of the Republican leader, John de Witt, who had set himself to reduce the power of the house of Orange, to which the Jews felt themselves indebted. He spoke heresy, political economic, religious, and when Aboab's colleague, Morteira, remonstrated with him, Spinoza replied sardonically "that he knew the gravity of his threats and that in return for the trouble which he (Mor-

teira) had taken to teach him the Hebrew language, he was quite willing to show him how to excommunicate'!" (20, p. 50) This mocking young man believed in the equality of all peoples, but he had no respect for his own.

So Rabbi Aboab hurled his curses at Spinoza with the same fury of invective which he had unleashed against the "children of Amalek", the Portuguese and their black Brazilians and their Negro slave commander. Many times he had described those horrors to the Amsterdam Jews, but Spinoza evidently felt himself not as one of his people. May he be cursed then with all the terrors that the Jews of Brazil had known. May the black Brazilian slave commander visit vengeance upon him. Rabbi Aboab read the decree: . .

"The chiefs of the council do you to wit, that having long known the evil opinions and works of Baruch de Spinoza, . . . that the said Espinoza should be excommunicated and cut off from the nation of Israel; and now he is hereby excommunicated with the following anathema:

"With the judgment of the angels and of the saints we excommunicate, cut off, curse and anathematize Baruch de Spinoza, . . . : by the 613 precepts which are written therein, with the anathema wherewith Joshua cursed Jericho, . . . and with all the curses which are written in the law. Cursed be he by day and cursed be he by night. Cursed be he in sleeping and cursed be he in waking, . . . The Lord shall not pardon him, the wrath and fury of the Lord shall henceforth be kindled against this man, . . . The Lord shall destroy his name under the sun, and cut him off for his undoing from all the tribes of Israel, . . .

"And we warn you, that none may speak with him by word of mouth, nor by writing, nor show any favor to him, nor be under one roof with him, nor come within four cubits of him, nor read any paper composed or written by him." (12, p. 17-18)

The experience of excommunication is perhaps the most traumatic that a religious person can undergo. He is suddenly alone, utterly so, and in this region where no one knows certainty, told that his opinions are evil and damned.

All the forces of the community, all the symbols which he has been taught to respect from childhood years, are arrayed against him. It is the act by which the full power of the community's super-ego is turned against the individual's solitary rational self. The haunting threat of excommunication by the Catholic Church was enough to paralyze the great energies of Lord Acton, and to make him the author of the greatest historical work that was never written. And in recent years, George La Piana has written movingly on his life spent as an excommunicate, seeking sources of value within that very experience of intellectual rejection and isolation. Spinoza himself denied that he was affected emotionally by his excommunication, saying: "All the better; they do not force me to do anything that I would not have done of my own accord if I did not dread scandal;" . . . (20, p. 51) None the less, he had contested his accusers before the Beth Din, "feeling that his conscience had nothing to reproach him, he went cheerfully to the Synagogue", and he had denied before his judges the charge of "the most awful of all crimes, namely, contempt for the Law." (20, p. 48)

Spinoza knew how excommunication could arouse all the hatreds of a community against a man, and destroy him. As a child of eight, he had seen how the Amsterdam Jews had broken the spirit of the proud Uriel Acosta. That troubled man had left Portugal and his juristic career to identify himself openly with the Jewish people at Amsterdam. But he was disillusioned with the Jews as he found them in actuality, mean, petty, money-seeking, intolerant. He rebelled against the community's leaders and was excommunicated. In the streets of Amsterdam, Acosta narrated, "many of them spit upon me as they passed by me in the Streets, and encouraged their Children to do the same, . . . set their Children upon me in the Streets, who insulted me in a body, as I walked along, abusing and railing at me, crying out, 'There goes a Heretick, there goes an Apostate.'" The child Spinoza witnessed the horror of Acosta's recantation: . . . "I stripped myself naked down

to the Waste, tied a Napkin about my Head, pulled off my Shoes, and holding up my Arms above my Head, clasped a sort of Pillar to my Hands, to which the Door-keeper tied them with a Band. Having thus Prepared myself for my Punishment, the Verger came to me, and with a Scourge of leather Thongs gave me nine and thirty Stripes, . . . During the Time of my whipping they sang a Psalm . . ." Then, "I prostrated myself, the Door-keeper holding up my Head, whilst all both old and young passed over me, stepping with one Foot on the Lower Part of my Legs, and behaving with ridiculous and foolish Gesture, more like Monkeys than human Creatures." (8, p. 21-30). Soon afterwards, Acosta killed himself.

Spinoza remembered all this. His own ideas on ethics and natural law were indeed much like those of Acosta. Spinoza would never recant. He fortified himself against the communal pressures for what is now called brainwashing. The excommunication stirred within him the deepest anger. He could withstand it with the help of his Mennonite friends. He came indeed to hate the Jews for what they had done to him, and could never write of them without invective touching his pen. This hatred, in a man like Spinoza, indicates how deeply the trauma of excommunication went. "Now the Hebrew nation", he wrote, "has lost all its grace and beauty (as one would expect after the defeats and persecutions it has gone through) . . ." He referred to the revered Maimonides' writings as "harmful, useless, and absurd", "mere nonsense", an efforts "to extort from Scripture confirmations of Aristotelian quibbles." He repudiated the ancient rabbis, writing that it was "grievous to think that the settling of the sacred canon lay in the hands of such men." As for the later Rabbis, they "let their fancy run wild, . . . dream, invent, and as a last resort, play fast and loose with the language." The Kabbalists among them, of whom his teacher Morteira was one, indulged in "childish lucubrations", "whose insanity provokes my unceasing astonishment." (15, p. 108, 118, 17, 147, 56, 139-140) The Jews were simply "Pharisees" to Spinoza, arrogant, intol-

erant men, and the "foundations of their religion", he wrote, might well have "emasculated" the minds of the Jews. (16, p. 353; 15, p. 56) And he, Spinoza, would not allow himself to be emasculated. The Jewish community and its religion were summed up finally by Spinoza in this metaphor of "emasculatation", the threat of intellectual and spiritual sterility conveyed under the symbol of castration. His reason had met the threat of the communal super-ego, "though I was imbued with the ordinary opinions about Scriptures, I have been unable to withstand the force of what I have urged."

There were violent radical political emotions in Spinoza. Usually, he kept them under close control. An excommunicate Jew, suspected of political heresy, he had to guard his words well. His feelings once expressed themselves in a strange way, in a drawing, where one can see more clearly the emotion behind the geometrical facade. His early biographer, Colerus, tells the story:

" . . . he apply'd himself to Drawing, which he learn'd of himself, and he cou'd draw a Head very well with Ink or with a Coal. I have in my Hands a whole book of such Draughts, amongst which there are some Heads of several considerable Persons, who were known to him, or who had occasion to visit him. Amongst those Draughts I find in the 4th Sheet a Fisherman having only his Shirt on, with a Net on his Right shoulder, whose Attitude is very much like that of Massanello the famous head of the Rebels of Naples, as it appears by History, and by his Cuts. Which gives me occasion to add, that Mr. Vander Spyck, at whose House Spinoza lodged when he died, has assured me, that the Draught of that Fisherman did perfectly resemble Spinoza, and that he had certainly drawn himself." (3, p. 392)

In fantasy, Spinoza projected his own face in the costume of Massaniello. If a philosopher today were to take joy in drawing his face beneath Lenin's famous cap, or in the austere Asian garb of Mao-Tse-Tung, we should draw a simple conclusion concerning his underlying political sympathies. And likewise with Spinoza's self-projection into

the person of Massaniello. Tomas Aniello, for that was his full name, was a young illiterate fisherman of Naples. In 1647, Tomas led an insurrection against the Spanish viceroy. During the few days that he held power, he revoked the hated fruit tax which bore on the poor, and promulgated a decree for constitutional reform. Though he was soon murdered by his enemies, his movement continued to gain, and when the Spanish navy attacked Naples, it was met with the cry "Long live the Republic!" The rebels defeated the Spanish forces, but their Republic did not long survive. Europe was amazed at these events. Massaniello for six days shook the world with the spectacle of the illiterate fisherman who had humbled Europe's proudest monarchy. (10, p. 19-26)

The radical republican Spinoza was a Jew, disfranchised from practical politics. His deepest feelings, which he had to repress in the Holland around him, where Calvinist clerics waited to denounce him, he placed into a drawing. Repressed aggressions moved within him, and in an amusement of a strange kind, he gave expression to them: " . . . he look'd for some Spinders, and made 'em fight together, or he threw some Flies into the Cobweb, and was so well pleased with that Battel, that he wou'd sometimes break into Laughter." (3, p. 395)

His philosophy grew into a curious network of ambivalences. He detested the masses for their irrationality, but he defended them against the advocates of absolutism. He conceived a vision of God which was the apotheosis of the sublimation of love, and which he felt would bring him a mystic's release, - "And only in this union, . . . does our blessedness consist. . . For even the knowledge that we have of the body is not such that we know it just as it is, or perfectly; and yet, what a union! what a love!" (17, p. 133) And yet this love, which was supposed to bring freedom, was suffused with internalized self-aggression. The frustrated revolutionist turned his aggression inwards in a masochist passion, - "it follows therefore that we are truly servants, aye, slaves of God, and that it is our greatest per-

fection to be such necessarily." We are like a "Hatchet" says Spinoza, in the hands of a Carpenter, a tool to render good service. "For the sole perfection and the final end of a slave and of a tool is this, that they duly fulfill the task imposed on them". This "true service of God" is "our own eternal happiness and bliss." "But if God should (so to say) will that man should serve him no more, that would be equivalent to depriving him of his well-being and annihilating him; . . ." (17, p. 115-117) We are like "hatchets", - in this symbol once more of destruction taken on willingly, Spinoza naturally expresses his philosophy. God is the mathematical despot who geometrizes with sadistic indifference to human beings, while we must delight in our status as theorems. Recently, when a writer on philosophy died, his eulogy said that he had conformed to Spinoza's saying: "He who loves God cannot strive that God should love him in return." Was a metaphysics of self-immolation, of self-aggression, ever more simply stated?

As an excommunicate Jew, Spinoza would never quite fit into any ordinary social group. He conceived himself finally, despite his social and political aspirations, and numerous friendships, as essentially solitary. "And he would say sometimes to the people of the House, that he was like the Serpent, who forms a Circle with his Tail in his Mouth; to denote that he had nothing left at the years end." (12, p. 393-394) His self-chosen symbols were ultimately less those of the love of God, than of the auto-erotic recluse. His seal was an oval ring, containing a rose with his initials, and the word *caute* (*beware*) to his fellowmen (16, p. 441) He longed in later years to speak the Spanish language of his childhood; it was the tongue of his earliest, most intimate feelings, but excommunicate, he spoke Dutch and wrote Latin, never at home in these languages of the alien world. To a correspondent in 1665, he confessed: "I do indeed wish that I might write the language in which I was brought up. I might possibly express my thoughts better." (16, p. 151) And then there was the haunting doubt which besets every man who has staked his life on an idea. What if

others are right and he is wrong? What if his understanding had misled him? In one such moment, Spinoza acknowledged this possibility, and said: "Even if I was once to find untrue the fruits of my natural understanding, they would make me happy, since I enjoy them, and I endeavor to pass my life not in sorrow and sighing but in peace, joy and cheerfulness," . . . (16, p. 173) What a confession for a votary of reason! An ultimate pragmatism, that his philosophy brings him happiness, and that this rather than truthfulness is its final appeal! It is the mission of truth, however, which leads a man to defy excommunication. The pragmatic path is one of doubt, not the direction to martyrdom.

But we must return to the dream of the "black and scabby Brazilian." The mystic in Spinoza struggled with the frustrated political radical. No revolutionist ever frees himself from his earliest cultural values. Pietro Spina, the revolutionary protagonist in Silone's great novels, found that the Catholic idealist in him was not expunged by his conscious Marxist dedication. The residuum of an ineradicable, intractable conservative remains in the soul of the most radical reformer. The commandments we heard in childhood reverberate through our most adult years. Liberation is always fractional. Karl Marx disliked secularism, and advised his wife and daughter to seek religion in the Jewish prophets, if they felt a metaphysical need; he would yield them that opiate. (1, p. 74) And in the hours of sleep, the rational discipline of adequate ideas failed Spinoza, nor was the intellectual love of God of any avail.

The figure of the Negro terrorist, the spectre which Rabbi Aboab had described to the Amsterdam Jews, came to menace Spinoza in his dream. He was the symbol of all the hostile forces that await a Jew in the external world, all the forces of hatred, and Spinoza, excommunicate, would have to deal with them alone. The Negro Terrorist was the embodiment of all the curses of the world's powers which Rabbi Aboab had summoned up against him.

Clear, independent thinking is a kind of parricide. It

is an act which is revolutionary in essence, for by free thinking, the individual sunders the bonds of tradition, and hurls himself against the cultural super-ego. He dares to rise with only the power of his rational ego against the hydra-like tentacles with which he is enveloped by the unconscious superego.

Then arises the neurosis of the revolutionist. Guilt returns to him in the hours when he seeks sleep. The super-ego comes back to menace him in his weariness, when his philosophy fails him, when even the intellectual love of God is far too peripheral, confined to the consciousness. Anxieties emerge from his unconscious, which reproaches him for disloyalty. The subversive is subverted by the sense of guilt with which the communal super-ego lies in ambush. And all the resources of his philosophy are, for a moment, helpless against forces from the irrational deep. Such, we may surmise, was the meaning of Spinoza's dream in 1663. The trauma of the excommunicate never healed.

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Virtue and Necessity

by

Mortimer Ostow, M.D.

The living organism can tolerate relatively little change in its environmental circumstances—not only because altered circumstances have a noxious effect—but because the organism has learned to utilize its environment for its own needs.

It is not sufficient to say that the terrestrial organism tolerates oxygen or that it requires oxygen for survival. The terrestrial organism has developed an oxygen conveying and enzymatic respiratory mechanism which utilizes oxygen provided at the partial pressure which prevails on the surface of the earth. A substantial change in that partial pressure in either direction has deleterious effects. Similarly the photosynthetic process permits green plants not only to tolerate but to utilize atmospheric carbon dioxide.

Physical aspects of the environment too, are employed to the advantage of the organism. Aquatic animals not only tolerate water but depend on it for locomotion and circulation and conveyance of metabolites. Birds not only manage heights but become adept at learning to drop hard objects (e.g. clams) in order to break them or to frighten intruders (Tinbergen). Locally prevalent colors are used to camouflage. Nest construction utilizes available building materials with seeming ingenuity. An especially striking instance of turning a necessity to advantage is parasitism.

It is not only external necessity which the organism turns to its own purposes; it exploits the data of its own constitution. Phylogenetic studies have abundantly demonstrated that evolutionary advance is accomplished by the direction of old embryonic anlage to new forms and functions. The differentiation of gill slit primordia to a series of head and neck structures is one well known example. The assignment

of primitive nephric structures to the genital apparatus is another.

The individual organism too, makes the most of constitutional necessity. Metabolic end products (carbon dioxide and ammonia) before being discarded, are employed for regulation of acid-base and fluid balance. Even after separation from the chemical reaction chamber, excretions are turned to good use; many animals use them to label territory and to offend, soil and bomb attackers.

From these considerations, one may entertain the idea that the facility of making a virtue of necessity is an important feature in species success. I should like to suggest that, at least in humans, it is an important feature of normal psychic function and may be one of the features determining individual success.

The stimulus-response pattern for the description of both animal and human behavior has been superseded as a result of ethologic and psychoanalytic studies by means of another concept. The newer idea is that motivation arise internally; in the case of lower animals, by glandular and nervous changes (timed by seasonal, diurnal or metabolic signals) and in the case of humans, by the dynamics of normal psychic function. Once the motivation for a given instinctual need exists, the organism then begins to scan and range the environment in an effort to find a suitable object for his instinctual need. Animals recognize suitable objects by stereotyped 'sign stimuli'. The same is probably true of human infants. Among human adults the 'sign stimuli' are less stereotyped and less compelling, and yet the existence of a configurational nucleus, constitutionally provided, is demonstrated in the pervasive symbolism of dreams, myths, humor and art. The human, motivated at a given time by a given instinctual wish, searches the presenting environment for a suitable object and opportunity to gratify his wish. He takes advantage of environmental necessity to gratify an instinctual wish.

One might say that an animal, motivated by hunger, will scan the environment for a suitable morsel of food. When

he sights such a morsel, pursuit and capture mechanisms are set into motion. The human, however, does not wait until he is hungry before acquiring food and certainly not before acquiring the means of getting food. (Certain animals store food too, but not as a result of foresight—rather, in response to seasonal changes). In an acquisitive mood, he will take advantage of opportunities to acquire, whether or not he is currently hungry, cold or lustful. The succession of instinctual interests is determined, for the most part in humans by psychodynamic forces. When the environment abruptly makes urgent demands to which attention must be given, a shift in instinctual disposition may be effected. But such an event may be considered a distraction rather than an element in the program of instinctual gratification.

Some instinctual wishes are recognized by the subject and he gratifies them deliberately and consciously. These include, for example, the wish for food, for shelter and for heterosexual gratification. Yet the amount of planning and effort devoted to the direct pursuit of these gratifications is usually less than the amount of thought and effort devoted to such intangibles as prestige, affection, respect. These we attempt to consider merely necessary adjuncts to the acquisition of more directly gratifying objects. However, psychoanalytic scrutiny discloses that much of human effort cannot conceivably be dedicated to the acquisition of food, shelter and heterosexual pleasure while much that seems to be so dedicated actually derives its principle motivation from sources which are not known to the subject. For example, it is common to hear a patient disturbed by a neurotic disorder, assure the psychiatrist that his problem is purely financial. If sufficient funds were available, there would be no neurosis. Yet the very same neurosis may next be encountered in another patient who can complain of no material deprivation. Such a patient will cast about for another rationalization. One wife will complain that her husband does not love her since he does not find a way to support her adequately. Another with the same symptoms will complain that her husband only gives her money and gifts because he

cannot give her affection. To the psychoanalyst, it becomes evident that what is wished is not money or prestige or even tenderness. What is wished is a gratification which, if it were offered could neither be accepted nor even acknowledged consciously. Such wishes usually are found to be wishes for sexual and destruction gratification by socially unacceptable objects and by unacceptable means (i.e. repressed wishes). In an effort to gratify these wishes partially or symbolically the subject casts about for suitable substitutes. Money, education, prestige and such are common substitutes and are therefore treated irrationally. Here again it is clear, that what the environment offers, even though essentially unrelated to the instinctual need, is seized upon by that need for partial, that is, symbolic gratification. These counters, money, prestige, so on, are especially suitable for this use since, in society, they are real needs in a practical, deliberate sense. One pretends that the conscious need is the only one, but pursues the counter with intensity derived from the unconscious need. It is necessary both to earn money and to repudiate unconscious needs. It becomes "virtuous" to pursue and accumulate money with a fervor not explained by practical considerations—in other words to take advantage of the acknowledged need for earning a livelihood in order to gratify inadmissible, repressed needs. It is as though the psyche were asking itself: Here is an obligation which I cannot escape—is there any use to which I can turn this obligation? And the answer is: Yes, the pursuit and accumulation of money can be used as a partial gratification of this or that unconscious instinctual tendency.

It is not only environmental necessity which is utilized for the satisfaction of instinctual needs—personal, or individual necessity is similarly exploited. A man with an unusually well-developed musculature and good proportions will take advantage of this particular characteristic by turning it to use in social or even commercial spheres. Individuals with good artistic or musical senses will develop these abilities to serve them. Similarly, an intellectually gifted person will train his intellect for his best advantage. It may be objected

that these last few examples illustrate making the most of an asset, rather than making a virtue of necessity. However, the necessity of which I speak is the necessity of constitutional endowment, from which one cannot escape—and of which one must make the best use. Moreover, the individual often cultivate defects as assiduously as assets, if he can turn them to advantage. Thus a wounded war veteran may use his injury to justify a demand upon his family or his society which might otherwise he rejected. Disability due to an acute physical illness may be retained after the illness has ceased because the patient has discovered that the illness with its disability warranted the gratification of passive unconscious wishes which, if they were indulged under other circumstances would be considered shameful. When the disability is caused by an accidental injury which is financially compensable, the relief from the necessity of working, the real economic advantage and the unconscious passive gratifications of being taken care of physically and being supported financially, all reinforce each other so powerfully that in many instances the disability becomes intractable and permanent. This is the problem of the 'compensation neurosis'. The exhibition of weakness to disarm an opponent, the exaggeration of a defect to escape military obligation, surrender to an opponent to hasten a profitable reconciliation, are all instances of making a virtue of necessity. There is a story about two Israelis discussing measures to improve the economy of Israel. One suggested that Israel declare war on the United States. When he was challenged to justify this astounding proposal, he replied, "Well, see how well the Germans fared after having been defeated by the Americans. The United States participated in the reconstruction of West Germany and see how prosperous it is now. If we can arrange to be defeated by the Americans, we too can become prosperous." "Yes," said his friend, "but what if we win?"

Impairment or alteration of consciousness can sometimes come to symbolize a repressed form of sexual pleasure. It can be for this reason that children occasionally induce verti-

go by spinning around. Some individuals with seizures are aware of the alteration of consciousness preceding the seizure, and in a few of these, a connection with a sexuality is made so that the alteration of consciousness then affords sexual gratification. In the case of a young woman who consulted me about her seizures, it was plain that she suffered much more from anxiety lest a seizure occur, than from the seizures which were infrequent and, at worst, inconvenient—scarcely dangerous. She spoke of the seizure experience much as if she were describing an attempt to prevent orgasm and then, in resignation, succumb and enjoy it. There is no question but that her seizures are real. However, it is also true that the subjective experience of the initial alteration of unconsciousness has become the focus of neurotic concern. There are children with petit mal epilepsy whose seizures can be precipitated by flickering light. A few of these learn that they can evoke seizures by passing the hand with spread fingers rapidly up and back before their eyes. To the dismay of his parents, an occasional child has been found to occupy himself for hours by inducing seizures one after another in rapid succession. Evidently the experience of the seizure is gratifying to the child who thus makes a virtue of necessity.

Just as one may see in the evolutionary development of somatic structure the process of making a virtue of necessity, so one may discern in the human psyche, elements of primitive behavior integrated into, and forming the building blocks of a new form of psychic organization. Let us consider, for example, the concept of technic of satisfaction of instinctual needs. Lower animals display, in the pursuit of a given instinctual goal, three types of technic. There are first, the appetitive technics, consisting of methods of ranging, searching and scanning, in an effort to spot a suitable object of the instinctual need. There are second, the approach or preparatory technics which serve to bring subject and object together and in proper position for the consummatory act, which, in turn utilizes the third or consummatory group of technics.

The appetitive technics include technics for scanning

the environment with the organs of perception and the organs of locomotion. Among humans deliberate and systematic searching of the external environment is employed on many types of occasions, but the same technic is more often turned inwards upon the memory apparatus when the individual embarks upon a new project. Given an idea of a suitable object, the human searches his memory so as to avoid being limited by his perceptible environment, but the technic of searching is the same. Among the appetitive technics one may include also, the technics for calling attention to oneself. These consist of methods of stimulating the sense organs of suitable objects for example, by offering visual, auditory or olfactory displays. Among humans, these technics are much elaborated and form the basis of many social institutions including the advertising and public relations industries.

The approach or preparatory technics are those which tend to bring subject and object together for execution of the instinctual act. They include for example, fighting, threat, pursuit, trapping, manipulation, deceiving, negotiation of topical obstacles (such as heights, depths, barriers, water, enclosures), persuasion, courting, compelling, testing, showing, stealing, imitation, accumulating. Among humans all of these technics can be recognized. They exist in simple forms, not essentially different from these seen among lower animals; they also exist in derived forms. The negotiation of topical obstacles is extended into a whole system of transportation including the use of vehicles, channels, bridges and so on. The technics used in courting are familiar to all. Such methods as trapping, threatening, bluffing, manipulating, compelling are usually indirectly employed, using such intermediate accessories as money, prestige and verbal agreements. Planning and calculation, problem-solving in general, are newly evolved methods of ordering the other, more primitive technics in the most effective sequences for achievement of the goal. Testing, which in lower animals consists merely of close examination, in humans becomes the whole science of measurement, experimentation and the intrapsychic technic of imagining consequences.

Finally, there are the consummatory technics, those which complete the instinctual act. These include technics for the use of those structures of the body which participate in the consummatory act. They include technics for eating, coitus, defecation, grasping, attaching, linking, handling, forcing. Among humans, these technics can obviously not differ much from the same technics in lower animals. However, even some of these are elaborated. For example, the use of tools may be considered to be an elaboration of the use of limbs and appendages. Technics of incorporating, penetrating, receiving, are extended from their original objects, the body contact apparatus, to sheltering structures in general. Moreover, the modes by which two organisms make contact may form the models for a host of geometrical concepts.

Provided with primitive instinctual technics by his animal heritage, the human turns them to his psychic advantage in the following ways. First, he releases them from their assignment to a single instinctual task, and makes them available for any instinctual need in which they can possibly be used. For example, the technic of sucking in lower mammals, is almost completely restricted to the feeding instinct, and, I believe, to the feeding behavior of the young animal. In humans, sucking, though the only mode of nourishment of the newborn, is retained for use through adult life—and, finds employment in overtly sexual behavior as well as feeding behavior. Second, the human detaches the technic from its original anatomic apparatus and makes it available to other apparatus. For example, when transferred to sexual purpose, the sucking technic is not restricted to mouth-breast contact, but may be applied also to mouth-mouth, mouth-genital, mouth-skin, and in the auto-erotic sphere, mouth-finger contacts. Third, the technic may be transferred from the service of instinctual contact between individuals, for use in the manipulation of things by tools. Thus, the technic of sucking becomes the technical modality of the mechanical suction apparatus. This derivation can be seen, for example, in dreams in which a suction apparatus e.g. the sucking effect of a whirlpool, or of quicksand, or of water

going down a drain, is used to symbolize the primitive wish to be consumed by the parent or to consume him. Fourth, the technic may be abstracted from things to ideas. For example, from the technic of sucking, we develop not only tools for sucking mechanically, but also the concept of suction or vacuum, the concept of emptiness. Fifth, I should like to propose the thesis that the technics of which I have been speaking may be used to determine the various modalities of thinking to which the individual may have access. Thus, one speaks of an absorptive mind. A patient once told me that when he had difficulty memorizing material at college, he would imagine his brain lying on a printed page, and the letters and words being sucked up from the page into the brain. Similarly the technic of biting gives rise to incisiveness as a quality of mind, the technic of sphincter control to retentiveness, the technic of genital penetration to penetration as a quality of mind, and the technic of genital reception to receptiveness.

The point may become clearer if we turn to the group of technics of managing topography. In the fourth category of technic exploitation, the topographic technics may lead to the formulation of geometric concepts. In the fifth category, they may lead to topographic or geometric modes of thinking. It is well known that some people conceive of relations among ideas in spatial terms. Such people are prone to illustrate their thoughts with diagrams and graphs. Freud, for example, was given to topographic thinking. His study on aphasia was an essay devoted to divorcing a psychic function, speech formulation from a static, topographic scheme. He proposed to substitute the concept of a dynamic process occurring within a spatial framework. At one point, he describes a hypothetical circumscribed lesion moving within the speech area. The conception and development of this notion are handled with a simplicity and elegance seldom found outside mathematics. Spatial conception are basic in the Project for a Scientific Psychology and some are illustrated by graphs. Most important, though, is the description of a good portion of metapsychology in topographic

terms. The very words, displacement, regression and repression imply spatial conceptualization. The terms, Unconscious, Preconscious, Conscious, as well as the terms Id, Ego, and Superego, refer to regions with boundaries. Now this type of description is not necessary. Many mathematical propositions can be stated, proved and utilized in arithmetic, algebraic and geometric forms with equal validity, though not necessarily with equal elegance. For example, there would be no necessary change in meaning if one spoke of substitution of ideas rather than displacement of intensities, of withdrawal of consciousness rather than repression, of sets of ideas rather than regional systems. If Freud had been of a somewhat different turn of mind, his description might have been couched in terms of logical implication, for example, in terms of intrapsychic manipulations or of systems of related ideas with considerably less appeal to spatial concepts. However, one should not lose sight of the fact that that certain data lend themselves more easily to one type of treatment than another and considerable versatility of approach is necessary for consistent astuteness in dealing with many facets of an extensive problem. This means that a man can do his best intellectual work when he turns his attention to a subject whose nature requires the use of the intellectual modality which he prefers and which he has developed most highly. It is my aim to demonstrate that intellectual modalities are elaborations of simple instinctual techniques.

While it is evident that humans can have only that knowledge of the world which they can filter through their organs of perception, I think that we must also infer from this discussion that they can conceive of only a limited number of types of relations among things. It may be true that natural selection has so operated that the conceptions which the human can utilize correspond broadly to the nature of relations in the external world, but there is no reason to assume that the correspondence approaches completeness. I can obviously give no example of a relation which prevails in nature but which is humanly inconceivable (perhaps we have a hint of some humanly unresolvable inconsistencies, e.g. the

wave and the particle theories of radiant energy—the infinite and yet contracting universe) but I can mention two examples of quite fortuitous correspondence between conceptual modality and external reality. One is the atomistic theory of the composition of matter ventured 2,400 years ago by Empedocles and Democritus. Of course since the birth of man, guesses about the ultimate composition of matter have been numerous and varied. One thing they had in common: they were all expressions of an abstracted technic (use no. 4) or a technical modality of thinking (use no. 5). If the actual nature of matter turned out to correspond with any such abstraction or mental modality, then it had to correspond to someone's guess. A second example of fortuitous correspondence between conceptual modality and external reality is that of compulsive isolation as employed in primitive management of disease and currently by medical bacteriology. Because such isolating technics, abstractions and modalities exist in the human psyche, when a natural problem, infectious disease turns out to be susceptible to these approaches, we have a fortuitous though fortunate correspondence.

Since the human possesses only a limited number of abstract concepts and a limited number of modes of thought not only is his understanding of his universe limited but his creations must necessarily be similarly limited. Shelters, manufactured products, artistic creations, intellectual formulations, social institutions, political organizations, everything which is created with the assistance of the human psyche, must be restricted to forms and modes of operations which are humanly conceivable. By the same token, these creations can all achieve a significant function in human life. Every individual in our society is faced with a wealth of social institutions from which he can select those which he can use for his own gratification. What a man does with his environmental opportunities is, in this sense, making a virtue of necessity. He may use them for constructive as well as destructive purposes. He may use them to express and obtain love with respect to his fellow man, but also to hurt or be hurt by him. The full gamut of instinctual technics, in active

and passive roles, are utilized by the subject, his environmental creations playing symbolically the role of the object.

The instinctual technics with which humans are provided are often turned to another type of advantage, for which they were certainly not primarily designed—namely, the advantage of disease or neurosis. Since neurosis is essentially a consequence of pathologic operation of instinctual forces, its manifestations will necessarily be determined by the instinctual wishes of the neurotic individual. These wishes are formulated in terms of the technics described above and therefore the pattern of the neurosis is determined by these very technics. For example, the individual who favors topographic technics in his instinctual wishes, when he becomes neurotic, will be disturbed by pathologic wishes and inhibitions couched in topographic terms. This is the usual situation in the phobias. (N.B. Freud, who showed a predilection for topographic modes of thought had travelling wishes and fantasies—and also travelling anxieties). The person, who, in the normal operation of his instincts, prefers technics of forcing and arranging, when he falls ill of neurosis will develop compulsive needs and obsessive concerns about harming by forcing and disturbing arrangements. People who become depressed favor incorporation and exclusion fantasies. Schizophrenics, who make the world over into one which suits their needs, indulge in rebirth fantasies which are based upon the technic of discarding the old and starting afresh. The tendency which makes for neurotic illness can use for its purpose the entire content of the psyche.

The final subject which we shall consider is that of the nature of the instinctual drives themselves. The tendency to make a virtue of necessity may be seen in the area of overt sexual behavior. Animal observation (Beach, Ford and Beach) has established that both male and female patterns of behavior may be encountered in each individual. Differentiation, that is, preference for one over the other, in lower animals is facilitated by the circulation of hormones of the corresponding gonad. However, when there is strong sexual stimulation and no available heterosexual opportunity for

gratification, homosexual behavior may appear in animals whose heterosexuality was hitherto unquestionable. Unaccustomed homosexual behavior was also seen after bilateral removal of the temporal lobes of monkeys. On the other hand, human homosexuality seems to be unrelated either to endocrine dyscrasia or brain damage, but rather seems to behave like a neurosis. Moreover, while overt human behavior ordinarily shows only heterosexual preference, psychoanalysis discloses the existence of wishes characteristic of both sexes in each individual. What may we conclude? I believe it is reasonable to infer that each individual is born with neural mechanisms which can mediate all the male and all the female patterns of behavior. As a result of endocrine influence and also psychic experience and possibly as a result of certain structural influences in the brain itself, one set of sexual behavior patterns comes to predominate. This influence is primarily or solely organic in lower animals, and largely psychic in humans. However, the psychic forces which determine that there shall be only one variety of overt sexuality in humans does not preclude the operation of two full sets of patterns of sexual behavior in unconscious wish and fantasy. The preservation of both sets of patterns within the human psyche may be considered to be an example of converting the handicap of bisexual constitution into the advantage of a double set of technics for satisfying instinctual needs in which overt genital sexuality is not apparent.

The same principle may help us to get a clearer view of the role of the sexual instincts in human behavior. The psychoanalytic discovery that behind almost every thought and act of the human, sexual motivation lurks, has been resisted (for not wholly intellectual reasons) by those who ask why nutritive, aggressive, defensive and other behavior cannot be considered manifestations of autonomous, nonsexual instincts. It would be hard to refute this objection especially when one examines instinctual behavior in infra-human species. Here the individual instinctual drives are clearly differentiated by contact apparatus, by object and by technic of execution, items which cannot guarantee that any human

fantasy is non-sexual, since in analysis, it turns out that apparently non-sexual elements are substitutes for sexual elements. It must be kept in mind that the sexual instincts in psychoanalytic psychology, are the drives which unite individuals for the gratification of any need which requires the participation of at least two individuals. Genital heterosexual behavior is only one—the most mature—of a large number of sexual behavior patterns, the earliest of which is the experience of feeding at the mother's breast. Let us consider the instinct of feeding in response to hunger. If one acknowledges that there is a common element in all instinctual activities which lead to the physical union of two or more individuals, and that therefore one may consider all such activities to be driven by the sexual instinct, then one will be prepared to concede that suckling is the first sexual act and one will then understand why sucking, mouthing and kissing, play a significant role even in the most mature, genitally centered behavior. However the step from this acknowledgement to the understanding of all feeding—even in adults who are dependent on no other human—as sexual behavior, is not easy to make. Yet psychoanalytic exploration reveals that when feeding occurs in the dream of an adult, when a disturbance of the normal feeding pattern is a neurotic symptom, when psychosomatic symptoms affecting the ingestive apparatus occur, the source can always be traced to sexual fantasies. Without drawing any inferences about animal instincts which do not seem to require such an assumption, one may infer that in humans all instinctual behavior has been incorporated into the sexual instinct in the sense that its motivation is sexual, and that its manifestations have sexual significance.

Let me illustrate this point again. The non-social, wild animal has a diffuse aggressiveness in the service of both nutritive and defensive needs. He also has a grooming instinct which drives him to attend to the surface of his body. It is necessary to equip such a creature with a device which will prevent the direction of his aggressiveness towards his own body—and perhaps teach him what condition of his

body surface requires correction and what condition is satisfactory. It is my impression that the device which is employed is the affect of horror. The animal is provided with a mechanism which operates in such a fashion that the sight of a wound in its own body surface—and above a certain point in the evolutionary scale—in the surface of another member of its own species, evokes a restraining and even opposing force to whatever action or external influence can be associated with the initiation or aggravation of this injury. One physical response is the body shake which tends to shake off noxious agents. In humans, the opposing force is accompanied by the affect of horror which motivates withdrawal and is associated with shuddering which is probably a derivative of the body shake. Moreover, in humans, horror comes to attend not only the wound, but also the wounding agent; the horrible sight becomes a horrifying threat. As a result of this projection, the mechanism of horror comes to reinforce the mechanism of guilt in diverting destructiveness from other members of the same species. In very young children, aversion based upon horror (the associated fear being only secondary, if we are to accept this formulation) is frequently seen in the presence of any sight suggesting mutilation of a portion of the body. If this account of the phenomenon is correct, there seems to be little room for sexuality. Yet, when horrifying objects appear in dreams or neurotic symptoms, psychoanalytic exploration reveals underlying fantasies of genital (and most primitively of pre-genital, sexual) mutilation—usually association with guilt and anxiety. My explanation is that the necessity to avoid mutilation need not be excluded from consciousness, except for those fantasies in which mutilation is the consequence of extravagant, destructive sexual wishes. Since such wishes, in neurosis especially, are insistent and recurrent, most accessions of horror are the result of sexual wishes—certainly all accessions of horror which arise with no external provocation. Consequently, the entire mechanism for preventing self-mutilation is brought into the service of the sexual instincts, and horrifying fantasies are invariably sexually mo-

tivated and sexually elaborated. On the other hand, the response to a real external threat of mutilation, unless it meets and is taken over by a neurotic wish, is usually brief, limited and terminated by cessation of the exposure. The rules for translating phenomena so as to discover the underlying sexual impulse, are matters of psychoanalytic theory and technique. One principle is the translation of non-sexual technics into sexual technics. Another is the recognition that solitary activities are in fantasy reflexive, or imply an absent but "understood" partner (c.f. the grammatical usage of the word 'understood' to indicate an element which is not stated but which must be assumed). At any rate, one may suppose that the human psyche has taken a number of disparate instinctual drives and placed them all at the service and under the control of the sexual instinct. This is again an example of taking equipment designed for one function and directing it into the service of another—of making advantageous use of what is inevitable.

Finally, let me apply this principle to the dualistic instinct theory of Freud. During the first World War, it became evident to Freud that the set of erotic instincts was not sufficient to account for all of human behavior. The destructiveness and hatred which emerged in the war, as well as neurotic disorders could not reasonably be explained merely as perversions of erotic function. He concluded that death must be considered an integral aspect of each life and that the death of each individual from autochthonous forces can be deferred at the expense of the life of other individuals—that is, by deflecting outward the internal destructive forces. I believe that the mechanism for this outward deflection consists of the predatory instinct by means of which each individual supplies external living substances to preclude the necessity of consuming his own substance. In sub-human, and especially sub-primate animals, reproductive, intraspecific (erotic) and predatory (as well as counter-predatory, defensive) inter specific instincts are visibly discrete and readily distinguished one from the other. In humans, great plasticity is achieved by permitting the free recombination

of elements of instinctual needs. Free combination and recombination of elements obtain not only in the intraspecific instincts as well as in the inter specific instincts, but also result in combining into a set of pools elements (i.e. objects, technics, apparatus, roles) from both instinctual groups. Hence, in humans, one cannot distinguish between intraspecific and interspecific instinctual acts on the basis of any characteristic object, technic, apparatus or role. Instead we find it necessary to assume that all human acts are motivated by erotic forces which may employ any elements in the pool. However, it is also necessary to assume that interspecific destructive and defensive tendencies continually strive to express themselves but are normally held in check by the intraspecific, erotic tendencies. When, in cases of individual or social pathology, these destructive tendencies are able to assert themselves, they can do so only by perverting and simulating erotic behavior. Thus, no one will admit going to war because he wishes to kill. The reason is always defending or advancing some idealistic cause. Even in the unconscious, the need gratified by the fighting and killing is concealed in erotic terms—for the purely predatory tendency has no direct access to psychic representation. I make reference to this highly involved dynamic system only because it exemplifies most elegantly the principle of utilizing for a new purpose biologic material derived from obsolete sources. It is as though the principle of making a virtue of necessity were the essential method by which the human instinctual apparatus was constructed from its subhuman homologues. We see here a deliberate pooling of elements derived from different systems so that all elements become available for both tendencies. Moreover, under normal circumstances, the erotic tendency holds the destructive tendency in check even while making use of its technics, apparatus and objects. Under pathologic circumstances, the destructive tendencies take the initiative and turn the entire instinctual apparatus, with its erotic purposes to destructive use.

It will have been noticed that the principle I have been illustrating is in reality somewhat broader than simply mak-

ing a virtue of necessity, if one interprets the latter to mean making a good but unexpected use of the handicap. What I have illustrated is the principle of turning to one purpose a mechanism originally devised and provided for another. This is necessity in the sense that it is what is given. One makes a virtue of it in the sense of making better use of it in a new connection than was possible in its original context.

I have prefaced the discussion of the application of this principle in the human psyche with some examples of its application in simple biological situations, because I believe that the principle obtains for all living matter. I can conceive of a mechanism in simple terms. Every bit of living tissue is the site of the simultaneous operation of a number of chemical and physical processes which are so related that the end-products of one are the initial reagents of others. Only a relatively small number of irreducible end-products must be discarded. Making a virtue of necessity arises from no particular intelligence in living tissue, but rather from lack of intelligence. If any reagent or signal is supplied from an external source it is accepted and used in the same way as that provided internally. An added amount, increased pressure, or different rhythm of supply may make possible new manoeuvres which result in greater advantage to the organism. Needless to say, many, if not most of these adventitious intrusions are harmful but in that case the organism dies, its experiment unrecorded. Only when the change results in success, that is proliferation, will it come to notice. By this mechanism the necessities of fate can be turned to the advantage of the organism. When the adventitious circumstance is one which initially threatens the organism and when, nevertheless, some advantage is found which more than cancels the threat, the impression made on the human observer is that of a paradox, which in this case is called, making a virtue of a necessity. I would venture even one more guess, namely, that while making a virtue of necessity is a property of living tissue in general, the property is especially concentrated in the central nervous

system, and within the central nervous system, in the human psyche.

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Applied Psychoanalysis in the Drama

by

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Plays and allied forms of entertainment not only may be significant as works of art, but also they may serve as personal wish-fulfillment fantasies of their authors. Ultimately, moreover, they may serve as reflections of the aspirations, thinking, and feeling of the audiences they entertain. In respect to the latter, one may propose comparison of dramatic works with the Thematic Apperception Tests used by psychologists.

For example, the success of a play has always been dependent upon an identification of the members of the audience with the heroes and the heroines of the play. As with the Thematic Apperception Test, the interpretation, identification with, acceptance or rejection of the actions and the sentiments of the characters of a drama reveal vividly the orientation of the feelings and the thoughts of the audience.

As Freud very early pointed out, the myths, legends, and art products of a group or nation express unconscious wishes, fears, or defenses against these fears, common to its members. These expressions of the unconscious could not long survive if they did not reflect a general group tendency. As manifestations of unconscious thoughts they correspond to the personal fantasy, art or dream life of an individual. (1)

Starting with applied psychoanalysis in respect to the possible unconscious meaning of a dramatic art fantasy to its creator, a recent play by the playwright T. S. Eliot provides a striking example of the unconscious striving of an artist of the theatre to resolve repressed inner conflict. Upon examination in performance in the theatre, T. S. Eliot's *The*

1. Jacques Schnier, "Morphology of a Symbol: The Octopus," *The American Imago*, XIII (Spring, 1956), 7.

Confidential Clerk seems to reveal a variety of inter-locking wishes on many different levels seeking fulfillment in fantasy. One may venture to suggest that neither the author nor members of the audiences were aware of *all* that the playwright may have projected into this play. A perceptive reviewer of the London production would seem to have had some awareness of this.

Many . . . must have been surprised at the humour of the piece, and lulled into supposing that very little lay hidden beneath the amusing and often ironic manoeuvrings of several illegitimate off-spring and their too casual parents. But a dozen problems inevitably forced their attention upon even the most unwary of playgoers: the problem of man's essential loneliness; the father-son relationship, divine and human; the desire of man for creative fulfillment; the relentless search for the Ideal in parent and child and the bad effects of childhood insecurity. In a lighter vein, Eliot, it seems, will not have it that blood is thicker than water! (2)

From conversations with Martin Browne, the author's stage director and close friend of many years, it would seem that playwright Eliot was unaware of all that he had put into his play.

By approaching *The Confidential Clerk* as if it were a dream, one may gain insight regarding some of the dynamics of the creative process of the poet-playwright, T. S. Eliot; for "the theory of projection is intimately bound up with the theory of dreams, and dreams are more like plays than any other form of literature." (3) Moreover, such analysis may point the way to a more scientific analysis of why plays fail. It has long been of practical interest to theatrical managers why a play which has succeeded with one national audience will fail with another national audience, especially when the language of the original is the same for both national audiences; e.g. British and American audiences.

2. "Edinburgh, 1953", *Theatre World*, XLIX (October, 1953), 15.

3. Harold G. McGurdy, *The Personality of Shakespeare: A Venture in Psychological Method* (New Haven: University Press, 1953), p. vi.

It is a known fact that T. S. Eliot, like the American novelist Henry James, rejected his land of birth, the United States; T. S. Eliot became by choice a citizen of an alien land, England. Despite the fact that he would be able to tell what conscious intellectual considerations were involved in making this decision, one may assume—especially in view of his play *The Confidential Clerk*—that there was strong unconscious motivation to put distance between what will always remain a part of him: his country, his father, his family. Each being a symbol of the other. If this may still seem to some a daring or even outrageous venture in dramatic analysis, one is prompted to quote from the writings of a highly successful contemporary playwright.

Arthur Miller once said that he didn't invent, he documented. Elia Kazan (stage director), recognizing the personal source of drama, usually studies the playwright as much as the play when he is preparing a production. . . All good playwriting is, in a sense, the dramatization of a diary. Playwriting is highly personal, not necessarily autobiographical in detail, but certainly derived from the author's attitudes and points of view, which are in turn derived from his 'experiences'. (4)

The strong theme of *The Confidential Clerk* would seem to be the search for a father. As is often the case in a dream, there is a re-organizing of the facts—in this case the facts of paternity, for there is the wish to select the parent, not as dictated by reality, but to suit the need as viewed by the "dreamer"—the playwright. On the basis of his play, *The Confidential Clerk*, one may speculate that the playwright felt as a child that he was not equipped to compete with his father, whom he would seem to have seen as an awesome and formidable man.

If the play, *The Confidential Clerk*, were only a private fantasy, solely meaningful to the author, it would not merit the analysis worthy of art; in short it would not be a work of art nor would it be worthy of the attention of an audience

4. Robert Anderson, "Theatre; The Playwright; Some Reflections on the Unknown," *The New York Herald Tribune*, August 5, 1956, Section IV, p. 3, col. 1.

experiencing the play in a theatre. *The Confidential Clerk* is, in the opinion of the writer, more than a personal and subjective fantasy. T. S. Eliot is a gifted writer, with erudition, a depth of feeling, and a measure of the universe incapsulated in him. He speaks to his audience concerning the nature of man's outer and inner world.

As a kind of Virgil he extends his hand to take one on a journey into the lower circles of the unconscious. And, the unconscious is indeed a *selva selvaggia e aspera e forte*. From the reviews of the play written by the New York critics and from conversation overheard during the intermissions at the performance, the writer is of the opinion that members of the audience and the critics who attended the play were disturbed by Mr. Eliot's fantasy. Most seemed not to have the courage of a Dante to brave that forest shadowy, gloomy, and fearsome—the unconscious. There was on the part of some even passionate resistance to their giving themselves up to the play and becoming emotionally involved through identification with the central characters.

If one examines the play, one finds that the playwright has in the classical tradition invested the play with incest motives; T. S. Eliot has consciously invested a play of contemporary characters in a modern setting with echoes of the ancient Greek plays. At one and the same time he is playing an intellectual game of recognition of literary parallels and, with the intuition of an artist, he is playing a psychological game to deepen the emotional involvement of the audience with the characters. In view of the rejection of the play by New York audiences, it points up the fact that this latter game is a dangerous one to play, for the reactions of members of the audience seemed to indicate that Mr. Eliot had gone too far in loading the emotional relationships of the characters with the dynamite there is in the repressed incestuous wishes that exist in all men and women.

Before laying bare the unconscious purpose of the play, one must speak of the overt purpose of *The Confidential Clerk*. The author treats of the need that is being felt throughout our culture for *belonging*. All of the characters

of the play are experiencing loneliness and a sense of isolation. The progress of the play results in a testing by each character of what may lead him to a greater sense of belonging in common to each other. The character who invites the strongest identification is the young man Colby in search of a vocation and loss of self.

The first act is an exploration and an intellectual consideration of the attainment of *gemeinschaft*—a feeling of belonging—through art. At the climax of the first act, Sir Claude tells his illegitimate son, Colby, that he knows that the boy had wanted to be an organist, but had discovered he lacked the genius. The father reveals that he too had had a secret dream once of becoming a potter, instead of the successful financier that fate decreed. The father's and the son's paeans to art make of this scene one of the most beautiful and evocative to be found in a contemporary play. The second act is an exploration of a way to a feeling of belonging through emotional involvement with another human being. Colby renews his acquaintance with Lucasta, the tempestuous and provocative girl who is also a protegee of Sir Claude's. Lucasta talks intimately with Colby, and it is clear that these two are attracted to each other. As the playwright's characters psychologically move toward each other, suggesting ultimate sexual union, the playwright's "dream" blocks this road to the attainment of *gemeinschaft* through emotional involvement with the opposite sex; for Lucasta, thinking to gain Colby's deeper understanding and sympathy, reveals that she is Sir Claude's daughter. Shocked by this totally unexpected news—for Lucasta has no suspicion that Colby is her brother, since he is sworn to secrecy for the time being—Colby lapses into strained silence and draws away from Lucasta. The third act moves toward a testing for another alternative, as is common in dreams of frustration, to loss of self and, thereby, a finding of self. The resolution of the playwright's "dream"—the play—is achieved through the young man, Colby. By the end of the third act, Colby has achieved acceptance of himself for himself. He chooses for himself the humble post of church

organist and perhaps the church beyond. He accepts the invitation to reside, as if a son, in the home of the retiring confidential clerk. Thus, Colby has espoused art, accepted his limitations and has freed himself from the bondage of striving for "success". Among these themes of the "dream" there are many, as can be seen, which are positive and come to grips with conflicts which plague man in contemporary western society.

What seems to be characteristic of T. S. Eliot's writings, and to many a largely negative and defeatist aspect of the resolution of *The Confidential Clerk*, is the playwright's recurrent thesis that the most deeply satisfying completion of self is through submission to an authoritarian church, which excludes an intimate and personal human relationship.

The conscious and the unconscious strivings of the fantasy are joined at this level. Throughout the play, there is the wish for an expiation of guilt. It would seem that on the unconscious level for the playwright, along with rejection of the father (country), there had been great repressed hostility for the father—the one feeding the other. Expiation for rejection and hostility is achieved for the author in fantasy through complete and abject submission to a father figure. In this play a diminished father, the confidential clerk. So much greater the expiation.

Thus, *The Confidential Clerk* is but one example of the two major levels of an art fantasy of the theatre: on the one level is the consciously controlled fantasy inviting identification of members of the audience and on the other level is the unconscious strivings of the creator of the fantasy by means of which the author is seeking resolution of inner conflict. Members of the audience are not insensitive to the deeper personal levels of the fantasy. As Ernest Jones and others have indicated in their studies of the plays of Shakespeare, dramas may gain in universality and power from the hidden fantasy at the heart of the work.

Plays which win popular approval may be viewed as highly subtle sounding boards for detecting national trends and shifting cultural patterns. An analysis and interpreta-

tion of the plays of the last three decades of the American theatre would seem to corroborate the findings of psychologists, social psychologists, and anthropologists investigating the male-female relationship in American culture. In contrast to the popularly successful plays on the American stage at the close of the last century, contemporary American plays lack a clearly defined hero. The behavior of the heroine in relation to the now puppet hero of contemporary American drama reflects in score after score of popularly successful American plays the competitive struggle between male and female, sexual confusion as to the role each should play in our society.

A typical contemporary American play is one in which woman is all-knowing, all-powerful, all-loving, and largely triumphant over the male. Recent American plays run the gamut of situations in which the female is the disguised "hero" or is a real power behind the throne on which the author has placed a paper-maché hero.

For historical contrast, we may consider the Elizabethan Age, at which time England was enjoying a long but aggressive peace; England was on the move and in a state of ferment. It was extending its empire; it was challenging Spain; it was exploring the New world. Elizabethan England was a swaggering male, and the drama expressed a male point of view. Shakespeare's plays are about men living in a man's world. The Elizabethan audience that swaggered and brawled in the pit, that preened and postured in the galleries and on the apron of the stage, that fondled and pinched the orange girls hawking their wares was almost exclusively male. The titles of Shakespeare's greatest plays: *Hamlet*, *Macbeth*, *Othello*, and *King Lear* are the names of the central characters of the plays, and they all are men.

In the United States before the turn of the century, male stars in plays depicting the actions of heroes dominated the American theatrical scene. In every town large enough to boast an opera house, posters would herald the visit of Joseph Jefferson in *Rip Van Winkle*, James O'Neill in *The Count of Monte Cristo*, William Gillette in *Sherlock Holmes*.

These actors shared popular success and recognition with such famed actresses as Modjeska, Marlowe, and Bernhardt, etc. Fifty years ago, the average American male took as much interest in the stage as he did in sporting events. When the ladies left the table for the men to talk among themselves over coffee and cigars, the conversation ranged from Booth's interpretation of *Hamlet* to Jim Jeffries triumphs in the boxing ring. The American father, as head of the family, was most likely to pick the plays and take the family to see William Farnum in *Ben Hur*, or William Crane in *David Harum*, or Fred Stone in *The Wizard of Oz*. These were the long-run popular stage productions current on Broadway and on tour in the United States in the early 1900's. An analysis of these plays reveals them to be plays with heroes, in which the actresses of the day gave womanly support to the actors of the American theatre playing the heroes.

An analysis of the most popularly successful plays of the past twenty seasons shows that on the average eight out of ten plays lack a clearly delineated hero. During this same period in American stage history, the majority of the plays which received production on the professional stage depict women in competitive conflict with men. Covertly or overtly, the women of these dramas are depicted as triumphing over men.

One of the first ladies of the American stage, Miss Helen Hayes, achieved her longest New York run in *Happy Birthday* by authoress Anita Loos. Members of the audience were invited to identify themselves with a shy and inhibited librarian, Addie Bemis, who after a few drinks, emerges as an aggressive Cinderella. After imbibing ten varied alcoholic concoctions, she is liberated from her inhibitions. She breaks a bottle over her repressive father's head; she amazes her new found friends in the Jersey Mecca Cocktail Bar by out-talking, out-singing, and out-dancing her rival, a red headed hussey. In American Amazon fashion, she wins her Prince charming, a bashful and not too bright bank-teller, whom she fancies.

The most indigenous form of American theatre, the musi-

cal comedy, in varying degrees, reflects in part or in whole the tensions which exist in American culture between men and women. The heroines of a sampling of recent musical comedies: *Pajama Game*, *Damned Yankees*, *Silk Stockings* depicts woman as wholly or in part a castrating female. One of the most successful musical comedies of recent stage history is *Annie Get Your Gun*, which ran for over two years on Broadway (1,147 performances) and was highly successful commercially on tour throughout the United States. The title alone of the musical comedy is provocative of analysis and symbolizes most pointedly the male-female competitive struggle which is at the heart of the piece. Drawing upon Americanna for its plot, the musical comedy revolves around the rivalry in show business of the Sharp-shooter performer Annie Oakley and Frank Butler. One of its many melodious and tuneful songs is an overt statement of the conflict; "Anything you can do, I can do better", a duet in which Annie does triumph. The resolution of the conflict between two rival rodeo performers suggests that romantic love is the end-product of the hero's defeat at the hands of the heroine. When one compares this treatment of a near legendary American hero with the protagonists of American plays and musicals; e.g. *Floradora Girl* which were popular in the last century, one is pointedly aware of the shift in audience acceptance of stage fantasies with which they accept identification and emotional involvement.

Such popularly successful plays of the American stage as *The Magnificent Yankett*, *Harriet*, *Anne of a Thousand days* reveal that history is being re-written to suggest that the great crises of the past have been precipitated and resolved, not by men, but by women. "The American myth about women is not confined to radio. . . The play which carries this myth beyond the realm of probability into the domain of absurdity . . . is Maxwell Anderson's latest excursion into the history books, "Anne of a Thousand Days" As it developed in this play, it wasn't Henry who was responsible for the Reformation; it was Anne. She engineered the whole thing through Henry—almost thought it

up—and, while she eventually lost her head for it, she remained at the end a woman triumphant. A man whom I had considered one of England's strongest-willed monarchs was putty in her hands. Anne, in fact, is just Blondie all over again in Tudor dress." (5)

In the spring of 1955, Tennessee Williams' *Cat on a Hot Tin Roof* received both the Pulitzer Prize for Drama and the New York Drama Critic's Award. The springboard for the plot is that a fabulously wealthy plantation owner is having to decide to which of his two sons to leave his fortune. The obvious choice is son Brick, for he is the only one Big Daddy has any real affection for. However, Brick is an incipient alcoholic whom Big Daddy suspects of being homosexual. Brick is not too much interested in the estate, but his wife, Margaret, wants it desperately. He is no longer sleeping with Margaret, for he accuses her of being responsible for his best friend's death. Much as Brick scorns her, Margaret tenaciously clings to him with the knowledge that one day she will have him back. He is all she craves. A relatively "happy" ending is provided with Brick going back to the marriage bed to make good Margaret's lie to Big Daddy that she is with child, thus winning for them the inheritance.

The author's censure of the unloving, remorseless, and aggressive female protagonist—implicit in Maggie's curtain speech—was removed before the Broadway opening. It reads, "Oh, you weak, beautiful people who give up so easily. You need somebody to hand your life back to you like something gold. And I can do it. I'm determined to do it. And there's nothing more determined than a cat on a hot tin roof is there? Is there, Baby?" The producer and the stage director had felt that the harshness of the ending of the play would alienate audiences. However, the arbitrariness and the aura of approval produced by the changed ending puzzled the reviewers, and Mr. Williams has returned Maggie's cur-

5. John Crosby, "Radio in Review", *The New York Herald Tribune*, December 17, 1948.

tain speech, as written. The production has gone into its second year on Broadway, and the fact that the American women in the audience would seem to accept and to enjoy identification with Maggie raises many questions concerning the health of male-female relationships in American culture.

The stage has always mirrored the character of the audiences it entertained. The preponderance of authors who write for the stage, television, and radio are men, but today, unlike the Elizabeth Age, plays are written largely about women for women. This in itself is no cause for concern, were it not that the characterizations of heroines is as an aggressive, competitive, and castrating female.

Thorough analysis of this phenomenon in the American theatre, television, radio, comic strips, and best-selling novels is most important for both practical understanding of the "great audience" and for deeper insights into human relationships in American culture.

It is possible to predict that when there is less confusion and greater honesty and true love in the male and female relationship in the United States, it in turn will be reflected by the American stage, television, radio, comic strips, and best selling novels. American authors will again be writing scripts and creating fantasies which recognize and reflect healthful relationships between men and women. If there are once again American plays with heroes as well as heroines, accomplished American actors will be found to play them, for it is not because America can no longer produce great actors like Edwin Booth, Joseph Jefferson, James O'Neill, and John Barrymore that actresses Helen Hayes, Katharine Cornell, Judith Anderson and others dominate the American stage. Likewise, when that change in our Culture is reflected by the stage and allied forms of entertainment American men are likely to re-discover what their fathers knew fifty years ago—and men in other cultures in other parts of the world still realize—that deeply satisfying and inspiring emotional involvements are to be found in experiencing drama.

Such findings explain in part that social phenomenon

of the American male's drifting way from theatre, films, television and radio dramatic presentations. At the close of the last century, the American male, could as does his European and Asian counterpart to this day, comfortably identify himself with the hero of a dramatic presentation.

Having examined drama for (1) what it may provide in the way of insights into the creative process of the artist on the personal and unconscious level, (2) for what it may be able to tell us as to why a play may fail with one national audience, after having succeeded with another national audience, (3) for what it may add to the findings of social scientists in their diagnoses of a culture, we may now turn to consider how study of drama through applied psychoanalysis may sharpen our perception of an alien culture. "Real understanding is the only key to everything good, and communication is essential to understanding. Theatre, music and dance, the living and dynamic arts, are vital in such communication. In the United States we are still a little timid and self-conscious about "the arts" and especially international exchange of the arts. We have traditionally failed to recognize how much the arts really mean to the spirit and practical everyday way of life and thinking of other peoples of the world." (6)

The acceptance of a play by a particular national audience, despite the fact that it does not prove a play of merit by aesthetic and universally recognized laws of dramaturgy, may provide insight into the intellectual and emotional bias of that national audience.

"The changes, substitutions, or corrections that take place in the retelling of a personal fantasy or dream, or in the use of a specific art motif, are in the nature of associated ideas and are, therefore, meaningful indicators of repressed thoughts. We can, therefore, think of the changes and revisions through which a given national myth, art motif, or fantasy progresses, as in the nature of a series of associated

6. Robert Breen, "Cultural Envoys", *The New York Times*, Section II, p. 1, col. 1. August 5, 1956.

thoughts or associated designs of the group extended in time, and, thus, of great value in revealing unconscious content."

(7)

Much that an audience would deny in itself were it openly confronted with the facts, that same audience may accept, nay relish, those facts when they are disguised in myth and fable, dream fantasies, and deflected back to them from the stage, movie screen, and television set. When repressed prejudices, attitudes, or behavior patterns of thinking and feeling are bedecked with the glamour and authority of art, they come back to the audience with an aura of approval. (This may help explain why the playwright who treats of ideas and attitudes in advance of his audience has to wait for wide public recognition and acceptance. He may and frequently does incur the hostility of the popular national audience.)

With this in mind, let us examine a post-war German play, which has enjoyed wide-spread and continued popular success in Germany, for what entertains a popular German audience may reveal to us something of the heart and the mind of the average German today.

Germany would seem to be an admirable choice for exploration of applied psychoanalysis of drama for insight into the unconscious attitudes of an alien culture, for this is a nation for whom after two world wars, the theatre arts have seemed to be more essential than meat and drink. Likewise, here the theatre has not shrunk to one metropolitan center as it has in England, France and the United States. State supported theatres flourish throughout Germany in countless towns as well as in the cities. Each year there are more productions of the plays of Shakespeare and Shaw than in all of the English-speaking countries of the world combined. As a result of the highly developed city and trade union subscription plans, the German theatre audience is a highly reliable cross-section of the people.

7. Jacques Schnier, "Morphology of a Symbol: The Octopus," *The American Imago*, XIII (Spring, 1956), 7.

Die Abgründige im Herrn Gerstenberg by Axel Von Ambesser was the first hit play by a German playwright to receive production in a defeated Germany. The play requires very little in the way of decor; a platform suffices for the presentation of the play. It may have been that the American plays by Thornton Wilder, which had been produced in translation in Germany following the surrender to the Allies had been the inspiration for the form of the play. Or, with the practical realism that comes from the actual experience of working in the theatre, Axel von Ambesser, an actor as well as a playwright, had adapted himself to the crudely improvised stages and theatre buildings which had been salvaged from the ruins of Berlin.

The first impression derived from the play is of the disruption that follows in the wake of war, and, more importantly, of the isolation by the Nazis of the German theatre people from the rest of the world. It is a loosely and crudely fashioned play.

The central character of the drama is Herr Gerstenberg, and there are two additional characters bearing the names: The Better Gerstenberg and The Worse Gerstenberg. Like a Good Angel and an Evil Angel, they vie and wrestle with each other to influence the decisions of the protagonist, Herr Gerstenberg. In the numerous scenes of the play these two projections of the inner conflict of the pivotal character argue, reason, fight, and plead to gain the upper hand in dictating the course of action Gerstenberg will follow. Instead of dramatic conflict translated into action, much of the play becomes didactic debate.

The plot is a simple one. The title character, Herr Gerstenberg, is a middle-aged, prosperous salesman. Another character, father of an average German middle-class family, tries to promote a marriage between Herr Gerstenberg and his daughter, Lieschen, for there would be business advantages for the father through a union of his daughter and the salesman.

Conflict, however, arises out of Lieschen's love for a young student. The student returns her love, but he will be

unable to marry her and support her until after he has completed two more years of study. Lieschen tells Gerstenberg of her love for the student, and at length she wrests from Gerstenberg a half-hearted promise not to press the suit for her hand in marriage with her father.

As counterpoint to the romantic love of the young pair, Lieschen and the student, there are scenes in the play in which the power of sexual love is depicted. Although Gerstenberg is not unmindful of the business advantages to him through a marriage with Lieschen, he is strongly attracted to a passionate, mature woman of his acquaintance, Lotte.

As the sequence of scenes has brought Gerstenberg into conflict with himself, the three act play has arrived at the climax of the second act. Herr Gerstenberg's alter egos, The Better and The Worse Gerstenberg, take over the action of the drama and debate which marriage Gerstenberg should consummate.

Up to this point the exposition of the relationship of the characters and the development of the action have aroused interest and have prepared the way for emotional involvement and identification on the part of the audience with the characters of the fantasy. Now the drama delivers shock to the receptive spectator. The Better Gerstenberg, in his persuasive arguments, ignores Gerstenberg's promise to Lieschen not to press for her hand in marriage; The Better Gerstenberg presses for Gerstenberg's marrying Lieschen. The Worse Gerstenberg exercises his persuasive powers to motivate Gerstenberg to follow the dictates of his "heart" and to marry Lotte. As the curtain falls, The Better Gerstenberg has beaten the Worse Gerstenberg to the ground, and as justification for his violence he states unequivocally that when there is a conflict between duty and what one wants, one must always follow the course of duty. By the end of the third act, Herr Gerstenberg has made his decision. He informs Lieschen's father that he will marry his daughter.

As is appropriate to the structure of a three act play, the second act climax has precipitated the crisis and the con-

flicting issues have been joined. However, the characters, as created by the playwright, fail to react to the crisis in a positive, assertive manner. There is escapist philosophizing that after all, life is a dream. The stage manager, a character in the play, who has been threading his way through the play, commenting on the characters and the action, becomes more directly involved with the characters of the plot. Lieschen protests to the stage manager that her fate is a loveless marriage, and the stage manager's only response to her is that life after all is a passionless joke, that her fate does not have the stature of tragedy, that perhaps her fate is just a prank of evolution.

This in brief is the drama, *Die Abgründige im Herrn Gerstenberg*. As among the first of the post-war plays by a German playwright, it enjoyed immediate popular success throughout Germany. Today, almost ten years later when Germany has made impressive economic recovery it is still played and acclaimed by German audiences. Thus, the most significant fact, and the most puzzling, is that it continues to be a popular success with German audiences. The play strikes one as being hastily written and weak in structure and characterization. Despite this fact it is a popular success with the most knowledgeable of theatre audiences and would seem to satisfy them deeply. In a country where standards of dramaturgy have always been among the highest in the Western World, its acceptance as a drama invites examination and closer study.

Let us review the elements of this drama, as if it were a dream inviting collective identification on the part of members of an audience. Herr Gerstenberg does not choose freely a mate; he submits to the tyranny of a questionable abstraction, duty. The playwright provides no indirect criticism of this attitude toward duty on the part of Gerstenberg, nor does the playwright through his mouth-piece, the stage manager, deliver any overt objection. As for the character, Lieschen, she may protest to the Stage Manager that her fate is a loveless marriage, but not once in the play does Lieschen question the authority of her father, who is ex-

plotting her, his daughter, for materialistic ends. At the conclusion of the play, Lieschen asks the stage manager why the audience did not shed a tear for her, why the audience did not come to her rescue. Since the stage manager is clearly the spokesman for the author of the drama, the playwright through this *raisonneur* offers no realistic positive solution to Lieschen, or to the members of the audience who would have identified themselves with the character of Lieschen. The only answer given is submission to parental authority or duty, or escape through cynicism. Life is a dream; it is fate; it is a joke of evolution.

There can be little doubt that such a resolution of a play is negative, that in a wish-fulfillment dream it would bring into question the health of the dreamer. It would seem that these negative attitudes have been transformed through the subtle magic of theatrical art; it would suggest that with an aura of approval, unconscious submission to authority without question, pessimistic feelings about the individual's claim on personal happiness have been deflected back to members of the German audience attending this play. It brings into question the extent to which Germans today have changed in their attitudes toward parental figures and all authority figures, among them a national Fuhrer. The escapist philosophizing and the insistence on the mandate of duty of the play may also provide the German people with a measure of relief from guilt feelings for the crimes against humanity of the Nazi era.

In view of the thesis that conscious and unconscious depth satisfactions are derived by members of an audience through identification with the protagonists of a drama, one could wish that the popular German audience would reject this art fantasy. Not alone because it is an inferior play by German standards as well as world standards of dramaturgy, but more because it promotes pessimistic and submissive attitudes for the individual in relation to authority figures.

This one example has been selected for study through applied psychoanalysis to reveal what may be contributed by contemporary drama for a fuller awareness of change, or

lack of change, in an alien culture. The broad popular base of the German theatre provides an excellent field for investigation of this type, and one may propose applied psychoanalysis as a valuable tool for the gaining of insights as well into other national cultures. In France, the success of the plays of Henri de Montherlant invites study and analysis. As an atypical French play, in which the characters; e.g. the play *Maitre de Santiago* submit unquestioningly to authority and father figures, they merit analysis for giving insight into that part of the French theatre-going public they entertain. The superior craftsmanship of the plays of Jean Paul Sartre and Jean Anouilh does not wholly explain the acceptance and acclaim accorded their post-war plays. The negative philosophies of their plays, when analyzed, may indicate subtle shifts of feeling and thinking of French intellectuals. The growing popularity of western type theatre with the younger generation of the Japanese is a fruitful field for applied psychoanalysis in drama. As in the case of the German play cited, a western-style drama, *The Red Lamp*, has achieved a singularly long run for a play of this type. The impact of this inferior play, which examines in a confused manner the last war, both on the performers and on the Japanese audiences may indeed add to our understanding of changes in feeling and thinking in Japan today.

Thus, within the limitations of a short essay, the aim of the writer has been to indicate how the tools of psychoanalysis, provided initially by Sigmund Freud, may provide deeper insight into dramatic literature.

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Psychoanalysis in Groups: Three Primary Parameters⁺

by

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We have addressed ourselves for many years to the problem, What is the nature of psychoanalysis in groups (4)? What is group therapy? Much therapy that is done in groups, it seems to us, is not group therapy. Only if the group is used therapeutically does it become group therapy. By using the group therapeutically, however, we do not mean group dynamics which are derived from and applied to groups *in vivo* or in experimental settings. In such groups the objective is not therapy. Where the function, the *raison d'être* of the group is psychoanalytic therapy, group dynamics, which arise in all groups, have some bearing upon an understanding of the group but may not be essential for helping those persons who come exclusively for treatment. The interest for and preoccupation with group dynamics in a therapeutic setting often are a reflection of the therapist's resistances and transferences.

Moreover, we do not think that the group needs to be anthropomorphized. The group has no existence of its own. The group is a consequence of the activity of the individual members of the group. Each group member comes for his own independent personal need for therapy. For a variety of reasons he has accepted, more or less, that in a group setting he can best be helped to resolve his personal problems and find happiness and fulfillment.

⁺Extension of paper read at the Fourteenth Annual Conference of the American Group Psychotherapy Association in New York City on January 12, 1957.

We believe, nevertheless, that there are qualities about psychoanalysis in groups which differentiate it from psychoanalytic therapy done with an individual. The constant variables in group therapy need, then, to be sought and described.

On the basis of experience with psychoanalysis in groups we have so far been able to define three fundamental parameters. They need to be kept in mind if we are to understand the nature of therapy done in a group. In this way the level of therapeutic work will be improved.

At the outset we wish to express our conviction that these three dimensions make it possible to approach a variety of problems in the field of group therapy in a more pointed and useful way. We should like, therefore, to examine these three dynamic elements of psychoanalysis in groups; there are others, to be sure.

First are the *heirarchical factors* which can be seen in the interplay of horizontal and vertical reactions in status relationships. They are revealed in the quality of one's transactions with authorities and peers. Second are *multiple reactivities* indicating how one utilizes other members of the group and the leader in healthy and neurotic ways. Third are *intra-communication* and *inter-communication*. The one stresses self-knowledge leading to personal integration, the other knowledge of the self and of others leading to personal and social integration. The balance and contrast between intrapsychic focus and interpersonal transactions are included here.

One might ask the question, Why are we paying attention to these three parameters? What is their usefulness to the group therapist?

Everyone in our culture has problems in peer relatednesses and in authority transactions. No one escapes the heirarchical experience of a class society, whether in family life, in the community, at work, or other areas of living. None of us has completely worked out his difficulties with parents and siblings, with authorities and subordinates, as well as with peers. The group experience creates opportunities for

direct experiential observation of these differences, and by this scrutiny their nature is clarified. It is easier in the group to learn to understand peer and authority attitudes than in any other kind of experience, not only because peer and authority figures are actually present but also because multiple reactivities are encouraged in psychoanalysis in groups. Any therapy that limits the full emergence of the activities of the human being is not very effective. Many forms of therapy actually prevent the appearance of certain kinds of material and their full utilization. Finally, communication in its broadest sense is the matrix of all human existence. Alienation and aloneness, which are so common as to become a national malady, can be worked through more successfully in the group where the interpersonal interaction is at least as important as intra-psychic attention. Awareness of self and awareness of others are in ongoing focus and the one is not stressed to the neglect of the other.

Individual Psychoanalysis and Psychoanalysis in Groups

We have already pointed out, in an earlier paper, "In individual analysis equality can never be achieved, because, by its very structure, the vector is always in the direction of the vertical relationship. The heirarchical position of the analyst, no matter how benign it remains, takes the growing edge off the patient in individual or group therapy (5)." The absence of the group always makes it more possible for the individual therapist to maintain some real or neurotic position of superiority with regard to the patient. Because he comes for help and the therapist is the helper, it is hard for the patient to acquire a sense of equality of his own with the therapist. When supervising individual therapists, we have been impressed how often they tend to interpret any attempt of the patient to equalize the relationship as hostility and resistance to accepting the authority position of the therapist.

"Therapeutic-like behavior of members suggests that reparative resources do not reside in the therapist alone. The leader may capitalize upon this possibility and seek to re-

lease the therapeutic potential in other group members . . . (who) may make major contributions to the therapeutic activity in a group (1)."

The nature of the individual therapeutic situation calls for testing of reality and of experiences only in terms of the values and experiences of the individual therapist. Multiplicity, it seems to us, allows for creativity. Individual therapy, in a sense, exposes the patient to a homogeneous experience. He can relate only to one person or one kind of person. In analysis in groups, however, eight or nine other unique individuals allow for differences to appear and for other kinds of people to be accepted. The group rather than the analyst alone becomes the social ideal as well as the measure of oneself, with whom one identifies and from whom one learns.

In the individual analytic situation, then, little opportunity is given to the patient or to the therapist to examine, develop and work through peer relationships. Moreover, in the individual analytic situation, neither the therapist nor the patient gets an opportunity to see in action the multiple transference and counter-transference reactions or the movement of transference from one person to another.

The individual analytic situation tends to emphasize intra-communication. Traditional training and the personality of the more "orthodox" analyst favor intra-psychic patterning and intra-psychic activity. Turning within the self makes for intra-communication, that is, the attempt to understand and to communicate with the self, to examine the self and inner activities rather than interactions with others. The group demands, at least equally, inter-communication as well as intra-communication.

Some individual analysts criticize psychoanalysis in groups on this very basis. They claim that in the group setting less "free association" is possible, therefore, less unconscious material is available. It is true that less "free association" occurs in the group, but we think this is good. Over-emphasis upon inner processes may be unhealthy. The consequence, however, is not less unconscious material which

can be derived also from dreams and the analysis of resistance and transference, and other behavioral manifestations.

Individual analysis always takes place under conditions of isolation, more or less. This is due partly to the neurosis of the patient and partly to the method of individual analysis. The isolation stemming from the neurosis of the patient is not altered merely by changing from individual analysis to psychoanalysis in groups. Some patients remain isolated, for a time, even in the group. On the other hand, the methodological isolation implicit in individual analysis is done away with in psychoanalysis in groups. In individual analysis a person tends to behave as he or she would in isolation, whereas the group does away with part of the isolation. In the group situation the patient cannot long remain totally isolated no matter how he tries. The interactive, interpersonal, inter-communicative demands in the group are not to be denied.

It becomes clear on the basis of our discussion so far that optimal therapy provides a harmonious balance between the opportunity to work out the horizontal and vertical transactions, the individual and multiple reactivities, and the inter- and intra-communicative needs. The non-discriminate and exclusive emphasis upon one direction on each of these three continua always results in a one-sided or a lopsided kind of therapy. These limitations will be apparent as we proceed in our examination of variations in group therapy.

Combined Individual and Group Therapy

Combined therapy seems like a natural and happy resolution for those who would like to preserve the benefits of individual and group therapy without sacrificing what may seem like the special advantages of each. Unhappily, in practice combined therapy turns out generally to be individual therapy with "some group experience" like the "social group" or "fun session." The group is not used therapeutically in our sense but rather as a place to have experiences to be analyzed later in the individual session. The group may be used, also, quite out of keeping with its

nature, as support for the authority of the therapist. For example, when a patient in the individual session resists some interpretation of the analyst, he brings it to the group for confirmation. This can only make the patient more hierarchically oriented in all human relations, for even the peers are seen as "on the side of authority." This curtails also the possibility for differences to emerge and for the multiplicity of reactions usually to be found in group therapy settings. The indiscriminate use of individual sessions by the patient sets up an irrational opposition of therapist against group, whereas their real objectives are identical.

This state of affairs is a consequence of the therapist's attitude that "real" therapy goes on in the individual session; the group experience is merely a catalytic agent for the work to be done alone. Such an arrangement limits the interaction and the inter-communication which can and ordinarily do occur in psychoanalysis in groups. Sometimes, even in the group, individual therapy is done where the group is ignored or the activity and interactivity of the peers are limited. If the therapist is truly group-oriented, individual sessions, where necessary, need not interfere with the group experience. But, in general practice as we have seen it, having individual sessions routinely along with group sessions is a deterrent to the proper utilization of the group experience. The individual session can be used destructively by limiting the interaction, by setting the tone, or by limiting the expression of feeling in the group situation. But it may be used constructively if one is aware of the ever present relationship between the individual session and the group session and its implications. The individual session must never be employed by either patient or therapist as resistance to the group experience.

Heterogeneous and Homogeneous Groups

For a variety of reasons homogeneous groups can give rise only to a limited and limiting form of therapy. In heterogeneous groups there is opportunity to work through the problem of difference. The person gains a new value

and a new security. He can accept and be accepted by different people, persons who are different from each other and different from himself. His isolation is reduced and the possibility exists for working out relationships with peers as well as with authorities. Often the individual who feels different relates this difference to status, assuming that the hierarchical relationship is somehow intrinsic to human transaction. Those who are different from oneself are seen as either higher or lower than those who are the same as oneself.

In the heterogeneous group the individual has the opportunity to experience multiple reactivity possibilities and so move out of his isolation. As he emerges and interacts, he moves among peers who are different, as well as among authority figures who are different, because some of the other patients can represent authority as does the therapist.

We might raise the question whether one needs only authorities in order to work out one's authority problems, and whether in the group one works out only one's peer differences. In some of the studies with children there is indication that the socialization process occurs through the peers. The probability exists that one works through both kinds of problems both with authorities and with peers. In the group we might expect to work out interlocking authority attitudes by greater scrutiny of relationships to peers; in individual therapy we hope that by stressing authority problems in the transference, we will work out interlocking peer relatedness problems as well.

So far as multiple reactivities are concerned, in heterogeneous groups we can expect to find less mirror imaging and less identification. In the homogeneous group there is bound to be more hostility in seeing oneself in others. We should expect in heterogeneous groups more transference and counter-transference reactions, but also more reality testing and working through. Because of the varieties of stimulation in heterogeneous groups, interaction, change and movement are facilitated. There is clinical and experimental evidence of the advantages of heterogeneous groups over homogeneous

groups in encouraging multiple reactivity and more interaction among the members (2).

At least superficially, the heterogeneous group encourages inter-personal communication more than intra-psychic preoccupation. This is quite different from what occurs in the homogeneous group which really entirely limits any kind of inter-communication because you start with the assumption, I am like everybody else here. There is no stimulation or provocation to compare and to change. In the heterogeneous group intra-psychic communication is stimulated by virtue of the comparison of individual with individual, because of differences. In the homogeneous group the interpretive interventions of the therapist always focus the patient on intra-psychic examination because of the so-called sameness of all of the members.

The homogeneous group, like the very permissive group or leaderless group, seems to set up a pathological subculture which excludes all the rest of the culture. Only patients who are alike are admitted; all who are different are excluded. In the homogeneous group there is a greater tendency to act out. In the heterogeneous group, patients may act out more in the beginning, but ultimately they will solve their problems. This is not true for the homogeneous group which tends to be more isolating from reality, from differences, from the rest of the culture. One of the advantages of the heterogeneous group is that differences or alternatives do not have to come only from the authority figure, as in the case of the homogeneous group. In the heterogeneous group it is possible that alternatives may come from the peers. Sometimes when alternatives are offered by the authority in the individual or homogeneous group situation, they are resisted or submitted to but never accepted on a basis of equality relationship as from the peers. It may be that a teaching group or some form of social group may be more efficient if homogeneous, but this is certainly not so for the therapeutic group.

The Alternate Session

When patients regularly meet as a group without the therapist, we view such meetings as alternate sessions. "Alternate meetings represent, in general, a phase of testing, exploring and consolidating, wherein the patient learns to separate himself from parental dependency in its various forms (3)." The alternate session sometimes is seen as leaderless, but this view is erroneous. Even though the therapist is not present, there are always expressions with regard to the therapist and attempts to work out the hierarchical relationship with him. In the alternate session patients talk about their feelings toward the therapist. This comes out later in the session with the therapist. Moreover, the experience with alternate sessions during psychoanalysis in groups demonstrates that individual members take over leadership. By virtue of transference, there is always available some kind of leadership or authority. The alternate sessions is the antidote to the traditional detachment of the therapist.

Although, in the alternate session, emphasis is greater upon peer transactions, there is also examination of feelings and reactions with regard to authority figures. Support of the peers helps the individual work out some of his authority feelings and gives him courage to face the authority in the session when the therapist is present. It is true that in the alternate session leaders may be more easily made and unmade. Nevertheless, leadership does occur and some of the vertical problems are worked out and worked through. In the alternate session as in the session with the therapist, multiplicity of healthy and unhealthy reactions is typical. The alternate session affords opportunity for both intra-psychic and inter-personal activity. New fantasy material can emerge. Obviously, inter-personal or inter-communicative activity is quantitatively greater when the therapist is absent.

On the communication continuum, individual therapy is really groupless therapy in that one communicates largely with one person or, even more orthodoxly, with oneself. At

the other end of this continuum is the alternate session which is leaderless therapy only in the sense that the therapist is not physically present. Even at the alternate session there is awareness of the relationship to the therapist, and parental surrogates may give leadership. The absence of the expert, the therapist, however, seems to permit freer inter-communication and to lessen the necessity for intra-communication. There is, therefore, greater possibility for social interaction and social integration on the peer level.

Consider the case of the group therapist who does not permit alternate meetings. This kind of therapist is somewhat unrealistic because it has been our experience that patients seek out individual sessions with one another unless these are absolutely forbidden. Even then there may be some people who may take the chance. The therapist who will never allow them to meet together forbids them from exploring their real and fancied attitudes toward one another, their horizontal and vertical relations.

We think the group therapist must be flexible. He needs to be free enough to let the group meet without him and be able to meet with a patient alone when there is real need for an individual session. The group therapist who never allows an individual session is like the one who allows no inter-communication except under his surveillance. If he never meets his patients individually, he actually forbids them to explore their vertical relations to him. Some patients are afraid to express feeling in front of others, whether for the therapist or other members of the group. Others cannot express their feelings when in a face-to-face relationship. Still others are able to express themselves more freely only in the alternate session. The group therapist who fosters only inter-communication and interaction in the group can immobilize in that he isolates his patients and limits the possibility of a one-to-one relationship with the therapist. This is what happens with the Israeli sabra brought up in a crèche on a kibbutz. As a child he has no opportunity for an intimate one-to-one relationship with a parent; as an adult, therefore, he shows more anxiety and

difficulty in one-to-one relationships than in group situations.

The therapist who forbids the patients getting together, increases heirarchical relatedness and limits peer interaction. He blocks patients experiencing and experimenting with the quality of peer transactions. He cuts down on the multiplicity of reactivity and the working through of both the horizontal and vertical distortions. The therapist's rationale is that it reduces acting out, that if he permits patients to get together they will act out. The fact of the matter is many patients act out even in individual therapy, and we feel it limits his effectiveness as a therapist if he has to forbid acting out. Forbidding patients to meet limits interaction in that it sometimes reflects the therapist's wish that patients relate only to him. Also the transference phenomena that can occur when the patients are free to interact with regard to the peers, too, are curtailed. Communication is also blocked in that it forbids patients to be either intra-communicative or inter-communicative without the presence and the approval of the parental figure. There is no real resolution, therefore, of either intra-ppsychic or interpersonal problems.

Authoritarian group therapists of both the id-dominated and super-ego dominated varieties reject alternate sessions. In the id-dominated group every expression is intense; in the super-ego dominated group all intensive affect is forbidden or looked upon as acting out. Very permissive as well as very repressive therapy really deny the meaningfulness of the group experience.

The Permissive Group

Let us now examine the nature of very permissive therapy done in a group. The permissive group is one in which anything goes, which encourages acting out. It is essentially pseudo-permissive in that it masks an authoritarianism. So far as the heirarchical situation is concerned, the so-called permissive group emphasizes the vertical relationship; it is characterized by domination by the id. The therapist always maintains the distinction of being more of everything

than is the patient. He is more of a patient than the patient is; he is able more easily to go crazy, to enter into psychosis; he is able more directly to communicate his unconscious feeling to the unconscious feeling of his patients. Despite the double-talk, it is always an authoritarianism based upon the superiority of the therapist even in pathology.

So far as multiple reactivities are concerned, there is in this kind of therapy a tendency toward greater and greater isolation. Patients are encouraged to isolate themselves one from another as well as from the therapist. In the core phase of therapy the patient as well as the therapist are in individual isolation, each in his own pathological privy. This contamination with pathology without a working through is directed to creating a pathological subculture based upon intra-psychic pathology and individual isolation.

As a consequence of this isolation the patients' communications are blocked. There is no inter-communication. There is probably also no intra-communication in the sense of the word as it is used here. There is reliance on a kind of communication that exists, so far as we know, only in the minds of men, that is telepathic, unconscious-to-unconscious non-communicative communication. It is best described by one of these therapists when he suggests that the highest form of communication exists when the therapist sleeps and has a dream about his patient.

The Leaderless Group

We are led to a consideration of the leaderless group from our three parameters. In the leaderless group there is the apparent wish to have horizontal relationships with no vertical relationship. The leaderless group is an attempt to achieve therapeutic goals and work out problems without the presence of an expert. There is, therefore, no harmonious working through of any vertical vector since there is, theoretically at least, no leader in the group. It is our experience, however, that a leaderless group either breaks up, as, for example, if the therapist is sick or on holiday too long, or it will seek a leader because the members of the

group are not solving their problems. They are indeed communicating with one another, but they are communicating pathology without arriving at an understanding and working through of their problems. There is, therefore, a pseudo-multiplicity of reactivity in that there are many members of the group, but the kind of activity is always the same, namely, the communication of pathology without the attempt to improve the nature of the interaction. There is, also of course, no reactivity in the vertical direction. As for communication, there is interpersonal contact without intra-psychic awareness. In a leaderless group communication actually breaks down because of the continuous communication of pathology. This happens because there is no guidance, no leadership, no direction, no expert, no analysis and no integration.

New Dimensions

In the course of working out our three primary parameters, namely, the interplay of authority and peer relations, the multiplicity of reactivities and the directions of communication, we have become aware of the possibility of others. We are not yet ready to define the applicability of these other important elements; nevertheless, we should like to mention some. We have come to describe additional dimensions so far as: 1. values, 2. isolation, 3. control, and 4. support. Whether they will stand up, cannot be foreseen, but we are certain these are useful concepts in evaluating group psychotherapy.

Summary

We wish now to summarize some of our discussion of the three parameters. It is our opinion that good therapy can only be done in a setting that permits the maximal emergence of healthy and unhealthy material, fosters as many kinds of healthy interactions as possible, and results in the working through of as many problems as possible. In individual therapy, for example, the heirarchical aspect, the absolute and one relationship is the only one needed and

emphasized. In the individual situation, the relationship is monodirectional, from patient to therapist. This can happen also in some kinds of group therapy, for example, in homogeneous groups. A single dimensional, therapeutic experience, of necessity, must be limited.

We feel that good therapeutic outcomes can only arise where the hierarchical situation is clearly explored, and the patient has optimal opportunity to work through his relationships, in a realistic and experiential sense, with the authority as well as with the peers. This seems best accomplished in a setting which permits individual sessions on a one-to-one basis only when they are necessary, which places major emphasis upon the group working together under the leadership of the expert, and which permits group experience in the alternate session, in the absence of the therapist. In this way provision is made for peer and authority transactions. The multiplicity of reactivities, that is, stimulation of both the healthy and unhealthy variety, reveals how people may act and react to one another in different kinds of relatedness, for ultimate working through. This can happen only in a group setting and the membership must be heterogeneously constituted.

In the individual analytic session, the aim is, more or less, intra-communication rather than inter-communication, depending upon how classically oriented the therapist is. The emphasis is upon communication with one's own unconscious processes with the help and active or passive intermediation of the therapist. The activity is, therefore, more intra-psychic, from mind to mind, from the unconscious of the patient to the third ear of the therapist. Communication through the process of "free association," dream analysis and the analysis of transference and resistance is purely on the psychic level without the opportunity for the patient to demonstrate on an experiential level to the therapist and himself what the nature of his problems is. The patient communicates to himself his own psychodynamics. He becomes more aware of his persistent patterns, attitudes and responses to different persons and situations. All this is

done in terms of fantasy and the verbalized statements of the patient to the therapist.

In psychoanalysis in groups there is not only much more opportunity for but more emphasis upon the interpersonal, the interactive, the inter-communicative. Patients not only seek to intra-communicate, that is, to understand their own unconscious processes but this is achieved mainly through inter-communication, that is, one person's interaction with and expression of positive and negative feeling toward the other persons in the group including the therapist. Other members of the group are permitted also to interact with one another, and there is a great deal more inter-communication among the patients of a group, even if the therapist remains quite passive, than in the one-to-one relationship with the individual therapist. Moreover, there is opportunity in the group meeting including the alternate session, for a real experiencing of the various kinds of relationships rather than a mere verbal description that is shared by patient and therapist. There is the actual seeing *in vivo*, so to speak, seeing in action, seeing in reality, the reactions of two or more people responding to each other and working through their distortions.

The setting in which therapy is done plays some part in what goes on and what outcomes may be expected. We are not unaware that some therapists do effective work under almost any condition. However, it is working against probability, for the chances are less when the setting is intrinsically untherapeutic. Such conditions make it harder than is necessary on patients and therapist. Some arrangements are more favorable than others for real communication, for stimulating multiple reactivities and for working out the vertical and horizontal relationships.

In light of our discussion, training, treatment and research in group therapy must emphasize the general and specific implications of these three parameters. We believe they are in fact dimensions of the group psychotherapeutic process and reflect its nature. Attention must be paid, then, to these variables. They need to be kept in mind and con-

sciously utilized as emphases or guides for the kinds of material to be stimulated and scrutinized and the kinds of interventions to be made. The group therapist will want to know more about the ways in which patients relate not only to authority figures but also to peers. He will want to know the typical ways in which patients act and interact, the provocative roles the patients play as well as the kinds of reactions to which they are provoked by different kinds of persons both on the hierarchical as well as on the peer level. He wants to know, therefore, also the kinds of healthy as well as transferential reactions that patients may have to other kinds of persons within the group, when the therapist is present as well as when he is absent. Finally, we think he will want to encourage patients continuously to exercise not only self-knowledge, that is, intra-communication, but self-knowledge derived from the real experience of intercommunicating one's own feelings and having these feelings reflected, accepted, or rejected when in interpersonal contact in the group as well as in the individual situation.

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A Note On Stigmata

by

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Since Francis of Assisi more than two hundred cases of the so-called stigmata have been recorded. Ninety percent of these have been women, and to the writer's knowledge there have been no cases which did not profess the Roman Catholic Faith. It is the purpose of this paper to present an explanation of the phenomenon as a conversion symptom in terms of psychodynamics.

The tradition of stigmatization has been traced back to St. Paul (1) but the actual meaning of the cited passage is uncertain. Perhaps the most famous stigmatist was St. Francis who is reputed to have borne the wounds of the crucifixion on both hands and feet and is so depicted in religious art. In modern times the most famous cases have been those of Louise Lateau of Belgium and Therese Neumann of Bavaria. The latter is still living. In France a certain Martha Robin is reputed to have been stigmatized in 1918. She is at present in a convent, and efforts to elicit information concerning her case from the authorities at Chateauneuf-de-Galaure (Drôme) have met with refusal. An Italian, Gemina Galgani, is also reputed to be stigmatized.

The peculiarities in these cases which make them stand out from the classic conversion neuroses are: 1, the extent to which somatic participation is seen in the symptom in which bleeding wounds appear on the hands, feet, side, and more rarely the head and back in simulation of the passion of Christ. Somatic responses occur which are not under voluntary control, indeed which are not usually thought to be under nervous control at all; 2, the extreme degree of identification with a religious figure through auto-suggestion; 3, the periodicity of the symptom and its similarity to men-

struation; and 4, the immense secondary gain derived from the stigmata.

It has been shown that under hypnosis spontaneous bleeding at a specific site can be produced in a subject by suggestion. There is a report of nose bleed caused post-hypnotically and of bleeding produced on the skin of the forearm by lightly stroking the area with a stylet. (2) The patient was a hemiplegic, and the response could not be produced on the paralysed side indicating that nervous control of the responding area is essential for the effect. In addition, elevations of temperature up to five degrees centigrade have been obtained by hypnosis. (3) These cases support the thesis that given the proper mental state there is no organic reason why bleeding "wounds" cannot appear spontaneously at specific sites although the physiologic mechanism is not known. It is therefore unnecessary to postulate external trauma as a cause either as part of an intention to perpetrate a fraud or as produced unconsciously by self-injury while in a state of ecstasy. Hence medicine is in a position to go further than was Virchow who commented that the stigmata were either a hoax or a mystic phenomenon.

The periodicity with which the symptoms appear, once a week in the case of Therese Neumann, and the occurrence of bleeding suggest that they may be a form of vicarious menstruation. This is not too rare, and is consistent with the fantasy that the stigmatist is a man who is wounded (castrated), in this instance crucified Christ. By identification with a religious male figure incest guilt is lessened and punished at the same time since the subject of the identification is wounded and suffering. The periodic ecstasy of the stigmatist is a living through of Christ's passion in which the subject is acutely aware of the pain of his wounds and experiences a union with Christ. The mood fluctuates from one of great elation to one of extreme anguish and self-abasement.

Unique in these cases is the great secondary gain which these symptoms bring. Several such cases have been canonized, and the two most famous in recent times, Louise

Lateau and Therese Neumann, have received considerable publicity in Catholic circles. Miracles of cure as well as clairvoyance have been attributed to them. The Neumann home in Konnersreuth has become something of a Mecca for credulous pilgrims. The Catholic Church takes no official position on living stigmatists or on stigmatization *per se*, and it is not by itself considered a mark of divine favor.

Cases of stigmatization in males are much less frequent. The periodicity of the ecstasy does not seem to be a prominent finding in males although there is no reason to believe that castration fantasy may not play as significant a rôle.

In summary it is suggested that the following unconscious fantasies have a part in symptom formation and choice in cases of stigmatization hysteria: 1, I will be a non-sexual (Christlike) person—protection against incest in that I will be a person who cannot be sexually approached, i.e., an invalid and a saint; 2, I will not menstruate (be a girl) but will suffer a periodic wounding instead (be a boy)—fantasy of being a castrated boy; 3, I will punish myself and suffer for my incestuous wishes by periodically suffering the passion. At the same time I will gratify these wishes by a "union" (with Christ); 4, I will identify myself with a non-sexual person who is my lover as well. This is permissible only if it be religious in nature and be paid for with suffering. As with other conversion symptoms the stigmata serve as a gratification of unconscious wishes while being a defense against them.

There is no record concerning the psychiatric treatment of stigmatists. Recent cases have been kept under rather close custody by religious groups, and it has not been possible to test under reliable circumstances the various claims made of very low or nil food and water consumption. (4)

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FOOTNOTES

1. Galatians 6:17.
2. Bourru & Burot, *Comp. Rend. Soc. Biol. Paris*, 11 July 1885, p. 461.
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One Day I'll Live In The Castle!

Cinderella As A Case History

by

Helen Huckel

The content of this paper could be labeled "Life Versus Fairy Tale."

Wishfulfillment versus reality expresses itself in fantasies, dreams, and in the neurotic and psychotic escapes from life, yet nowhere as undisguised and undiluted as in the fairy tale. Here the disguise is most alluring, painless, and direct. Roheim calls the fairy tale "magically solved neurosis." (1).

Freud's paper, "The Three Caskets" (2) excellently illustrates this point. Life's most unacceptable part, its end, is clad in an enticing disguise and appears as something we desire and strive for. We frequently encounter three sisters in myth and fairy tale; according to Freud the youngest, most beautiful, most lovable of them, rightly analyzed, turns out to be a disguise of the eternal threat of mankind, death. Cinderella, Cordelia, and many others are chosen as the most attractive and desirable of their sisters. Yet, certain qualities common to all these youngest sisters mark them as just the opposite of what they seem to be. We know that dreams frequently employ this technique of disguise.

Ricklin, in "Wishfulfillment and Symbolism in Fairy Tales" (3), shows us how much the tale and the neurotic symptom overlap each other in their function of wishfulfillment. He reports the case of a psychotic girl who during many years passed her days stroking one of her hands with the other. This stereotyped movement was later understood as a symbol of shoe polishing. The genesis of her psychosis lay in a disappointing love affair with a shoemaker whom

the girl had hoped to marry. Her compulsive movement represented fulfillment of her greatest wish. The fairy tale would offer a master solution instead. Whatever the humble beginning, it leads to the throne and a kingdom. The prince or princess is yours.

In all fairy tales one finds the same contrast between fantasy and reality. Sleeping Beauty, through her slumber, spares herself the difficult transition through adolescence into adulthood, the trying time which every young person must face. Sleeping Beauty reminds me of a patient who was full of fears of analysis. "How wonderful would it be if you just hypnotized me and then awakened me to tell me that I am cured."

Sleeping Beauty is supreme mistress of life, time, and environment. The world stands still and waits for her redemption by an outside force. But my patient's world moved on, her friends married and had children, while she remained behind in neurotic withdrawal and isolation. Life passed her by, and she had to make her own efforts to catch up. No prince or psychoanalyst could spare her the pain of her own rebirth.

However, some sweetmeat remains for the parents in the story. One must have many virtues to be loved, such as piety, modesty, obedience, and respect for the parental authority. One must not risk nosy looks into tabooed rooms, i.e., the world of the grownups, nor play with forbidden "spinning wheels and needles", easily to be understood as penis symbols. Sleeping Beauty is easily forgiven, and gets her prince during her sleep. Other fairy tale heroines are harder punished for even less transparent sins. Snow White and Cinderella attempt to gain the father for themselves while they allow their mothers to die. However, Father vengefully marries a wicked stepmother thus forcing both, Snow White and Cinderella, through an ordeal before they each earn their prince. They are compelled to work; Cinderella must endure the summit of injustice and humiliation. She is the unquestioned stepchild of the family. Not only the stepmother and stepsisters abuse her, even her own

father delivers her unprotected to their fury. Cinderella must do the dirty work and sleep in the ash bin. Her clothes are rags, and she is forbidden all pleasures. How does she endure this fate? She is amazingly unneurotic and without bitterness. She maintains her great capacity for love which she had never the opportunity to practice. She preserves this unused treasure until the right opportunity presents itself. She doesn't look for triumph; it just falls into her lap.

In Helene Deutsch's screen play "Glass Slippers" the old fairy tale has been transformed into a modern psychological story. There are no peas and ashes, no doves to sort them out. The prince meets Cinderella in a rather bourgeois style. Cinder-Ella, unlike her fairy tale predecessor, is no longer the angelic being who answers humiliations with unlimited patience and devotion. She is a rebellious child who defends herself as best she can. She repays her sister's defiance with a hearty slap.

Yet, even in the new version, Cinderella, despite her justified hostility and wish for revenge, keeps her loving heart and capacity to enjoy life. Her dream is the dream of all masochists, "The day will come. . . ! The day, when I'll triumph over all. I'll see them at my feet, I'll be great!" Cinderella proclaims, "One day I'll live in the castle!" The entrance might even be the kitchen door. Her desire is neither for castle or prince. The essential goal is loving, giving up glory and triumph, and forgetting all the wrongs done her.

Perhaps we might question Cinderella's appearance in daily life. Would she after all be outgoing, friendly, spontaneous and warm-hearted? Would she be transformed into a loving and participating human being as soon as she is treated as such, regardless of the discouraging experiences of her former life? A real life Cinderella, a patient who came to my office, might answer this question.

To say "she had come" is an overstatement. Cinderella—we'll call her Gladys—was much too distrustful and hopeless to seek out therapy. My first contact was with

her husband who had approached me about his wife. He was a good-looking young man who seemed sincerely concerned about Gladys' condition. They had been married three years, during which time he had tried his best to make her happy. But she remained cold and unresponsive to all of his efforts. This manifested itself in her inability to return affection, and her rejection of sexual relations. She scarcely spoke to him, and when she did, her words were tinged with complaints and hostility. He wanted to have a companionable mate and to raise a family. His patience was extraordinary, as he was acquainted with his wife's difficult childhood, but patience has its limits. He wanted to divorce her, but feared to do so as she seemed on the verge of a breakdown. He requested me to prepare and arm her for the blow.

Then Cinderella-Gladys came. It was difficult to make contact with her as she didn't talk. For several months she never said as much as "hello", or "goodbye". I had to take a quite active role. I had to rely on slight facial movements and eyelid flickers for some indications of her feelings. She refused to use the couch and sat there stiffly on the edge of a chair as if she had to remain motionless lest she would fall apart. Her face reflected distrust and hostility.

I suggested that she must have been terribly hurt in the course of her life, and I doubted if she could possibly see in me anything but another tormenter. I told her I didn't believe that she could be happy with her self-imposed muteness, and wondered if she might not find relief in unburdening herself to me. I persisted in trying to gain her confidence and make her feel secure. After three months of analysis she gradually started nodding or shaking her head to my words.

It was quite some time before normal conversation was achieved. Although she admitted that she had dreams, she was unable to recount them. Finally, I suggested that she write them down. The majority of her dreams revolved around me. I appeared as a witch, mother or boss, and very

often as her dentist; always as someone to be frightened of. In one of her early dreams she saw herself waiting for a bus. She signaled the driver to stop, but he passed her by. Then she waited for the next bus which again passed her, but halted at the next stop. She ran and almost reached it, but as she lifted her foot to enter, it drove away.

In another dream she is at the dentist's office. She is full of fear in anticipation of the pain of an extraction. She attempts it herself, but the tooth breaks, and she is forced into the dentist's chair.

In her dreams she frequently sees somebody chasing her. At other times, on the contrary, she is shooting or stabbing an aggressor. In some dreams there are rooms and cars filled with many people but without space for her. In one dream she walks across the street to meet me, but a rock in the middle of the road blocks her from getting to me.

As Gladys failed to associate to her dreams, I again suggested the expediency of writing down her associations. Referring to the bus dream, it appeared that she was desperately looking for something to change her life and carry her along. I was her second analyst, and the two busses symbolize the two therapists failing her. This expresses the hopelessness with which she was starting her work with me. The underlying motif of the dental dream obviously related to the painful process of psychoanalysis.

Unlike Cinderella who always is thankful for offered help, Gladys preferred to pull out her own tooth. The tragedy of her life, a real Cinderella story, gradually emerged in the course of Gladys' analysis.

Gladys' father was born in Spain, the country of passions and vendetta. Her mother was of Irish stock, beautiful, but cold. A paternal uncle lived in another European country. His only son, who was a medical student, had died. The uncle made his nephew, my patient's father, come and live with him. Thereafter the young man was looked upon as a substitute for the deceased son. The uncle wanted him to study medicine, which was in accordance with the young man's ambitions. Later he became a successful surgeon

in his uncle's home-town. He met his future wife, Gladys' mother, in his uncle's home, and fell madly in love with her. Her family had been quite friendly with the uncle.

Gladys was the third child of the couple. Unlike Cinderella, she had a brother and a sister, and unlike the fairy tale Cinderella, Gladys was not the most beautiful of her siblings. Brother and sister were strikingly beautiful. Gladys was actually a pretty girl, but when she compared herself to them, she felt like Cinderella in rags. Both, brother and sister, were born under infinitely more favorable and promising circumstances. Father did well and had an excellent income. Both children were wanted and surrounded by love and luxury. Their wishes were fulfilled even before they were uttered.

Suddenly things were reversed. Father neglected his practice and began to act strangely. He made a series of bad investments in dubious enterprises. Often there would be outbursts of uncontrollable temper. He had fits of jealousy against his uncle, a happily married, elderly man, and accused him of trying to seduce his wife. At the beginning the father's Latin temperament was held responsible for his eruptions. However, as these outbursts continued, a mental institution was suggested. His wife, considering his behavior a passing disturbance, hesitated to accept this outcome.

Unfortunately a catastrophe occurred. One evening while his wife and uncle were bent over an illustrated book, Gladys' father suddenly entered the room. Their position seemed to confirm his suspicion. He seized a paper cutter from the desk, and stabbed his uncle several times. The uncle died instantly. The father was imprisoned in the criminal ward of a mental institution, and was soon after declared incurably insane. He left his pregnant wife and two little children penniless. Gladys' mother had a sister in the Western United States and came to live with her, far away from the scene of her defeat. There Gladys was born.

Gladys labeled her own birth a tragedy. She felt she had no right to live. Her mother had an extremely difficult

time raising the three children. She worked as a nurse alternating between day and night duty. Thus she was either away from home all day, or else present but overtired. The older children who had been admired and pampered by both parents constantly had the upper hand. Mother was afraid of their wild outbursts, and gave in to all their demands. Gladys, the unwanted child, became the scapegoat of the family. Everything the siblings did was tolerated; Gladys was constantly criticized. Mother managed to give the older children a college education. Gladys, like Cinderella, had to do the household chores. The sister got pretty clothes, Gladys the hand-me-downs. Unlike Cinderella, however, who was able to bear it with humility and resignation, Gladys was sullen and gloomy.

Mother, of course, set the pace for the treatment of Gladys. All three of the children were looked upon by neighbors and friends with a kind of condescending pity which hurt more than disapproval and criticism. "Poor children", people would say, "it would be better they hadn't been born." The children felt this sympathy as a humiliation for which they had to compensate. The two older did so by avenging themselves on Gladys. She, the only one born in the United States, was a stranger and was looked upon as an intruder. The others forced on her the little chores which they refused to do. Gladys felt frightened and didn't dare to assert her rights.

Gladys' first recollection was an incident in which she was chased around a courtyard by her brother with a snake in his hand until she fainted. This scene is typical for Gladys' whole life. She constantly feels threatened and persecuted. In response to these feelings Gladys would question herself as to what she had done to deserve this fate. She lost confidence in herself and others and hated the world and herself. Why wasn't there anyone who cared for her? All of the neighboring children had fathers who were affectionate and played with them; why had she no father? She never got a satisfactory answer when she asked.

Mother, who felt self-conscious as the forsaken woman,

brushed her away with flippant commands or flimsy and contradictory explanations. "Go and play", she would say, or "you haven't washed the dishes." Or she explained that Father had gone away and would never come back, or that he was on a long trip but would soon return, or that Gladys hadn't been good and had no father as just punishment. Finally the family decided to give her an answer which would keep her from further questioning. They told her that Father was very sick and being taken care of in a hospital.

But by that time Gladys had stopped asking questions; moreover she had stopped talking entirely. Why speak? One could never get a satisfactory answer anyhow. She began writing long letters to the father in the hospital. She was constantly alert for the postman and would daily ask him in a trembling voice whether he had anything for her. Of course her waiting was all in vain.

Years later she was informed by her sister that the letters had never reached the mailbox. Sister considered the family's performance a witty act. Gladys was concurrently told that her father had been a murderer and died a year ago in a mental institution in Europe.

Mother would always take the initiative in answering questions directed at Gladys whenever the two visited together. Gladys was often the target of petty family humor aroused by her brother and sister.

Interestingly enough, Gladys not only stopped talking, she soon stopped breathing. Her breath, her misery, and her fury were equalled and often held back. She developed an asthma and had innumerable attacks. Gladys was no Cinderella with her angelic softness and patience. There was an outward air of quiescence but an inner turmoil. Perhaps before she knew the truth, she had a premonition of her father's act and was afraid that her own violence could equal his. Children have a talent for sensing hidden mysteries. Factually we know that the two siblings had frequent outbursts of temper.

Gladys had a single friend in her Cinderella-existence, a roomer in her mother's house. He played with her and

carved enchanting wooden puppets. At age nine, when she was alone with him in the house, she recalls being shaken by terror when he engaged in sexual play activities with her. Yet, she didn't dare to object for fear of losing her only friend. She never disclosed these experiences to anyone. This was Gladys' first encounter with sex.

Her hatred of brother and sister was intermingled with admiration and envy. To be what brother was, to have what sister had, became the main objective of her life. If she couldn't keep up with them, she could at least enjoy what they had left behind. Gladys not only wore her sister's discarded clothes, but also accepted the boy friends her sister no longer had use for. Sister went to college and participated in all collegiate social activities. Cinderella-Gladys spent most of her time in the kitchen, and her only social contacts were the beaux her sister invited home. This grotesque sequence ended in Gladys' finally marrying her sister's divorced husband.

Gladys suffered from constant depressions and a sense of inferiority and depersonalization. Consistent with her paradigm in the story she tried to compensate for her misery by grandiose dreams and fantasies. She waited for the great miracle in her life, the prince who would avenge the many wrongs she had to endure, and put her, the poorest, the last one, above all. In lieu of Prince Charming she accepted her husband, an easy-going man who might have had a happy marriage with a less disturbed girl than Gladys or her sister. Gladys went on daydreaming. She had bouts of fantasies in which she would envision herself as an artist or writer of global fame. However, she never made a move in the direction of realizing any of her ambitions. It took many months of analysis before I could point that out to her by way of her dreams. They were typical of Cinderella's fantasies of grandeur.

In one dream Gladys was bathing in a very blue lake. A number of jovial young boys and girls were clutching together while Gladys stood off in the distance. In reality Gladys is a good swimmer, whereas in the dream she was not

able to swim. Suddenly she lost ground and sank. She would have drowned had not a boat just come, piloted by a man who jumped into the water to rescue her. On shore, as he lovingly bent over her she recognized him. The hero was George Washington. The greatest Father of them all had finally come to redeem our Cinderella!

Her second dream is still more obvious. The patient herself labeled the dream "striking" and "fairy-tale-like". Her associations pivoted around fairy tale motifs. She was waiting for a car which was to bring her to a party. At the sight of the car she was flabbergasted. The whole automobile was made of mother-of-pearl, studded all over with precious stones, glaring in a blinding fire of white, red, and green. The dreamer was overwhelmed, and entered the car. Unfortunately enough, simultaneously a man entered from the opposite door. He brazenly pushed his fingers into her ribs. The man reminded her of mother's roomer who almost violated her.

The car was a typical Cinderella carriage; but the man was not the rescuing prince. To her he was the impersonation of male brutality and sexual aggressiveness. Similarly every man turned into a sex-hungry maniac. Gladys would like the golden carriage, yet she refused to give what Cinderella gave. I was to become the good fairy who would provide her with an undemanding prince. This dream opened her eyes to the Leit-motif of her life, "the last ones will be the first." Yet psychologically it was difficult for Gladys to renounce the Cinderella-role, for it would have meant giving up the claim finally to become first, to triumph over the others, and to force them to realize who it was they had disregarded.

Both Cinderellas had indulged in dreams of future grandeur. But the story-Cinderella's dreams were a preparation for the role she had to play in later life. She envisioned herself side by side with a loving and beloved husband; her temporary suffering was a prelude to future bliss. In Gladys' case the situation was reversed. Her dreams were a withdrawal from life and happiness, and served to

construct isolating barriers around herself. Cinderella expected the prince but was willing to accept the cook; Gladys' dream-prince was her neurotic reason for rejecting what she could have. Cinderella was trustful of everyone who hadn't harmed her, whereas Gladys was suspicious of even those who were willing to help her.

In the course of her analysis Gladys learned to face and verbalize her aggressions, and thus became less fearful of them. She began to express her wishes, was able to stand up for them and thus to feel equality with others. Soon there was no need for the asthma which was seen as both an attention getting device, and a defense against relationships with other people. Her failing marriage took a turn toward recovery.

No fairy tale success this, neither as easy nor as complete as Andersen's or Grimm's. Analysis was all the more difficult, as Gladys had to go through the decisive periods of her life, the Oedipal phase and adolescence, with only the imaginary picture of a father instead of a father of flesh and blood. This way she had no realistic model for a husband either. She reconciled herself to the idea, however, that he was not transformed into a prince but remained a human being with all the assets and failings of such.

The castle in the air was replaced by a consolidated home where one could live and love and laugh. As a climax of the therapeutic achievement Gladys called me up three years after the termination of her analysis to tell me that she had a baby. "I am so happy", she declared, "I can scarcely believe it. It is a real miracle, a fairy tale!"

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